

# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME III.

JULY, 1910.

NUMBER 3.

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## IS CHRISTIANITY A MORAL CODE OR A RELIGION?

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NEW YORK

The answer to this question comes with great readiness from a host of those who tell us that the meaning of Christianity is summed up in a code of ethical principles. The endless strife of theological tongues has led weary souls to take refuge in the apparent simplicity of the moral law; the stress of the modern social problem has prompted others to fix their exclusive attention upon the Christian rule of conduct as offering the final solution. And so we hear from all sides the many voices that unite in the swelling chorus, whose burden is the lofty ethical precepts of the Sermon on the Mount or the noble utterances of the Hebrew prophets as the sum and substance of all essential Christianity: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them"; "Do justly, love mercy and walk humbly with thy God,"—Christianity means this and nothing more.

The assertion of an essentially moral Christianity comes to us backed with the authority of high scholarship. In the *Hibbert Journal* of October, 1908, in an article entitled "How may Christianity be Defended Today?" Professor McGiffert tells us that "to promote the reign of sympathy and service among men was the controlling purpose of Christ Himself," that "modern study of Jesus has made this very clear, and we are recognizing with a unanimity never reached in other days that it was for this Jesus labored and for this He summoned men to follow Him." The fact that this article, in spite of its confused reasoning and its inconclusiveness, is said to have been translated into several foreign languages, proves the strong hold which the moral interpretation of Christianity has obtained.

It is the purpose of the following pages to examine this view. We ask: What do the records teach? Do they permit the interpretation of Christianity as a set of moral laws? or do they imply something else, the religious or spiritual?

We have nothing to do with miracle, nor with any historic occurrences as such. Our inquiry is into the nature of that particular truth, or set of truths or principles, touching human life which Christ placed before the world and which the Church accepted as the Christian interpretation of life. It is perfectly possible, and it will serve a good purpose, to separate the historic events as such from the spiritual or philosophical teaching, and the reader will remember that our task is thus strictly limited.

In addressing ourselves to the subject, we are first of all impressed with a certain confusion of ideas. When we hear all this talk about Christianity being intended to regulate the social life of man, we are led to suspect a certain lack of reflection upon the essential difference between morality and religion. Let us clear our minds upon this point. Morality needs no definition. But, while the moral truths are addressed preëminently to the will, religious truths are for the reason. They concern the mystery of life; their subject-matter is God and immortality. Upon these they give or pretend to give a revelation. "Thou shalt not steal" is a moral law; "God is love" is a religious truth. The two are dissimilar. The nature of their relation is one of the fundamental questions of life; but they may be kept theoretically and practically dissociated. There are men who are moral but not religious, others are religious but not moral. Christianity offers no novelty to the moral sentiment of mankind except an example; its ethics are the same as those of other systems. What is new in Christianity belongs rather to the religious sphere.

This religious element is now to be ruled out. If we are to believe the apostles of the new Christianity, most of what eighteen centuries have innocently believed of Christ, his conception of a life in the spirit, was based upon an illusion. Christ thought of none of these things. At least he cared very little about them. What was ever on his mind was the welfare of "society." What he did was to affirm or reaffirm the maxims upon which life,

especially the social life, should be built. He gave to the world (to use the modern jargon) the dynamic of social evolution.

Is it possible to form a reasonable picture of the historic Christ upon the basis of a purely moral Christianity? Let us see. We should have to conceive of a Christ whose mind was filled with moral ideas and ideals. Religious conceptions were wholly secondary—the sediment perhaps of the Jewish traditions of which he had not quite divested himself. We should think of Christ somewhat as we do of the author of the Epistle of St. James, whose interest centred in moral and social questions, to whose mind “pure religion and undefiled” meant simply “to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction and to keep himself unspotted from the world,” but whose moral Christianity was garnished by certain religious principles: “Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above.”

Such a Christ—a Christ whose ideals were wholly moral, to whom religious ideas were secondary—is indeed not the Christ whom his followers have pictured for us. They were therefore misled. We may perhaps imagine that this misleading was due to certain currents of thought prevalent at the time. We know that ideas distinctly religious or spiritual had come into the empire and were very wide-spread in the first centuries of the Christian era. These ideas gathered about the cults which had been introduced from the East, of Cybele, of Isis and Serapis, and of Mithra. Few pages of religious history are more interesting than those which describe the nature and the prevalence of these ancient forms of Oriental worship. They were intensely spiritual. They carried with them and made prominent such spiritual ideas as New Birth, Mediation, Immortality, Fellowship with the Divine.

You may conceive the followers of Christ to have come under their influence. They may have been carried away by this spiritual wave, and so Christianity may have become tinged with a foreign coloring. They therefore let go what was essential in Christ's teaching and seized what was merely accidental and traditional. This they magnified and passed off as the kernel of Christianity. All subsequent generations continued to cherish the error, and it was reserved for the wise men of the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries to discover and correct the mistake and to restore the Christian religion to its pristine significance as the religion of moral and social progress.

Such is at least a thinkable hypothesis, equal in probability to other modern reconstructions. But does it correspond to the facts?

We have two assertions to examine: (1) that Christ's essential purpose was a moral one, (2) that his followers misunderstood him. Let us begin with the second of these.

If such a misunderstanding actually took place, it must have been immediate, at the very beginning; it must have taken place among the personal disciples of Christ, among the very men who knew him in the flesh, who sat at his feet and listened to his words and witnessed his actions. The spiritual or religious conception of Christ did not come in slowly and gradually displace the moral idea of him. Our records know nothing else but that from the very beginning Christ was acknowledged and believed in as a spiritual leader and teacher.

The proof is not difficult. In all the uncertainty which criticism has thrown around our New Testament records there are certain facts which every candid man must accept as genuinely historic. The first and foremost of these is St. Paul. Sober criticism has not questioned the historic character of St. Paul or his authorship of at least the four great Epistles. With him we stand on firm historic ground, and he is a witness whose character and sanity commend him to our confidence.

The theory which was once made the basis of a reconstruction of early Christian history, that St. Paul, representing gentile Christianity, stood irreconcilable over against the Jewish Christianity of the Twelve, has long been abandoned. We have learned to realize how closely identified was the Christianity of the Apostle with that of the original Twelve. The man who after his conversion went to Jerusalem and lived fifteen days with St. Peter (Gal. 1 18), who later again entered into conference with the apostles, to whom the "pillars" gave the right hand of fellowship (Gal. 2 9), who for a year lived among Jewish Christians at Antioch (Acts 11 26), who had the companionship of such men as Barnabas and Mark and others "of the circumcision" (Col. 4 10 f.) must

have been, in all essentials, in close agreement with the original apostles. But St. Paul's conception of Christianity is spiritual through and through. (To most minds this will appear self-evident; we shall return to the subject later.) We may therefore gather that the twelve apostles shared St. Paul's belief in a Christianity essentially religious or spiritual.

This conclusion is confirmed by the testimony of the Acts of the Apostles. The historicity of this book has lately met with strong indorsement, and in regard to many of the main facts can hardly be disputed. Thus we cannot doubt that the manifold witness of the Acts to the preaching of the resurrection as the burden of the apostolic message is true to history. The Christ, whose rising from the dead—however they came to that belief—they announced whenever they spoke, who was to St. Peter a "Prince of Life" (3 15), a "Prince and Saviour for to give repentance to Israel and forgiveness of sins" (5 31), who was "ordained of God to be the Judge of quick and dead" (10 42), this Christ was, in the minds of the apostles, something more than a moral reformer.

There is no avoidance of the conclusion that the apostles believed in Christ as a spiritual leader or revealer, not merely as a moral reformer. If this belief represents a misunderstanding of Christ, then it was the apostles who misunderstood him. But that the apostles who had lived familiarly with Christ, who had been his co-workers, should have so radically misconstrued his meaning or allowed themselves, after Christ's death, to be swept away by any wave of religious thought or feeling,—this proposition most men will find it difficult to accept.

But suppose the seemingly impossible to have taken place,—and historical research warns us to make large allowances,—suppose that, in those mysterious years after Christ's resurrection, which hide so many secrets, this misconception did somehow creep in, that Christ's mission came to be misunderstood, we should in that case confidently expect that the real Christ, the moral reformer, should somewhere have left some traces of himself and of his real mission. There must somewhere have been some who understood Jesus, and in the literature that has come down to us we shall surely discover some remains of the

original conception, some trace, however slight, of the existence of the correct valuation of Christ as a moral reformer.

But the closest examination of the Christian literature covering about one hundred years after Christ's resurrection, whether canonical or extra-canonical, discovers no remains of a supposedly original moral conception of Jesus. The emphasis upon morality in a few of the writings, in the Epistle of St. James, in the Shepherd of Hermas, the Teaching of the Twelve, and later in the Apostolic Constitutions, does not in the least invalidate this conclusion.

We pass to the other of the two propositions made at the beginning of this paper: that Christ's essential purpose was a moral one. We take up the records of Christ's life and try to discover the ideas of human life embodied in Christ's life and teaching.

And here, we may suspect, we have come to the source and fountain-head of the statements, so far as they proceed from professed critics, claiming for Christ's mission an essentially moral character. For in the gospels we are no longer on the same firm historic ground, such as the epistles of St. Paul afford. The Synoptic Gospels are compilations. Many, as St. Luke tells us, had "taken in hand to set forth in order a declaration of those things which have been fulfilled among us." From these many efforts at writing the story of Christ our evangelists culled what approved itself to them, sometimes giving to the original statements of their sources the individual coloring of their own minds, and we are led to look back from the revisions to the sources.

Here we have a free field and open course for the analytical faculty. The critic takes up his task and the gospel story is dissected. In this process the personal equation of the critic is quite as important a factor as the scientific principles of investigation, and the results vary in accordance with personal mental and moral idiosyncrasies. The latter in their turn are influenced by the spirit of the age, and so it may happen that in an age of intense social striving like the present, the critic, losing his hold upon the great religious principles that outlast all ages, and carried away by the gust of present-day enthusiasm, may think he discovers in Christ a great moral reformer.

The problem of the Synoptic Gospels has for many years been an object of inquiry. We are not called upon to enter into the intricacies of this problem. We only refer to some of its salient features in the present state of the investigation.

It has been the ambition of scholars to discover and reproduce the sources of our gospels, and a large amount of success has in these latter years crowned their efforts. Thirty-eight years ago Professor Bernhard Weiss, in a work whose acute and thorough criticism has perhaps never been surpassed, made out the text of what he called the "Apostolic Source." Others have carried on the task, and the latest worker in this field, Professor Harnack, today reproduces the "source" of St. Matthew and St. Luke in a form which he calls "Q." At the same time strenuous efforts are being made by scholars, by means of comparisons and by the aid of patristic quotations, to ascertain the *ipsissima verba* of Christ.

An intense desire for historic accuracy prompts the efforts of New Testament criticism. But while scholars are doing their best to get back to the original and trustworthy substance of the gospel narrative and to the assured words of Christ, they seem all unconscious of another and larger problem which their praiseworthy efforts make importunate.

This problem may be briefly stated thus: Where is the plain Christian man to go for his knowledge of Christ?

We are not dealing with an ordinary human life, whose record may be very interesting no doubt, but interesting only to a small group of intelligent and educated people. It is certainly an object worth considerable effort to ascertain the exact facts of Caesar's life. But how many are interested in Caesar compared with those who are interested in Christ? What is the vital concern in the life of Caesar, compared with that which makes the Christian world cling to Christ as the world's Master?

What, then, are the prospects for the countless multitudes who want to know of Christ? Shall they patiently wait until the critics issue a new edition of the gospel? We have little hope of such a revised gospel. Not even on the principles which are to govern the revision are the doctors agreed. We may be sure that the Christian world will not accept its

gospel from the exponents of modern criticism. Biblical criticism has achieved great results and will continue its appointed task, but it is a very specialized function of theological activity, and critics have too often been influenced by prejudice and lacking in sympathetic imagination, when they have attempted to rise above their specialty, and the world will not acquiesce in their dicta upon questions which involve a delicate appreciation of larger issues.

Shall we then accept the suggestion (which we remember seeing somewhere made by an eminent scholar) that every individual should investigate the authenticity and credibility of a text before he makes use of it? How few are competent to do this! This principle would surely make of Christianity an esoteric religion and the glorious boast of its democratic character would be a thing of the past. To suggestions of this nature, which would remove the gospel of Christ beyond the reach of all but the specially trained, we are bound to oppose a decided negative. The Christian world must have an open gospel accessible to the plain man.

But this does not remove the difficulty which the suspicion cast upon the gospel record has made, and we are bound to find a way out. In attempting to do so, it will perhaps become evident that the difficulty itself is caused by a misunderstanding. We shall therefore suggest three propositions which seem to us to embody the truths necessary to enable us to see our way more clearly through the cloud of uncertainty which the analysis and criticism of our records have brought down upon the great religious problems.

(1) The fundamental question of fact in the Christian religion, the resurrection of Christ, as a question touching an historical event, must submit to a strict historical investigation. While it is true that belief in this fact will depend largely upon the spiritual discernment of the meaning and value of Christ's life, yet the intellectual appreciation of the historical conditions must always be fundamental to an assured judgment.

(2) Only very few religious truths are vital for our life. There are few things in the religious sphere today more important than the realization of this simple fact; and yet the simplicity of

religious truth is often grievously misunderstood. Professor Henry Sidgwick, in speaking of trust in God's fatherhood as expressed in one of Tennyson's stanzas, called this trust "the indestructible and inalienable minimum of faith." It was a strange misapprehension for so clear a thinker. Trust in God is surely the maximum of Christian faith. It marks the very topmost summit of conviction to which the human spirit can attain. Whoever in this world of contradictory phenomena attains to a faith in God needs little else. You may add just one more article, the belief in immortality, and you may say, It was to establish and make firm these two foundation-pillars of human life that Christ came, taught, and died. These two alone are vital.

(3) Finally, we are called upon to carry out to its logical conclusion the one assured result of modern criticism, the destruction of all human infallibility. The doctrine of an infallible Word, which never had any logical foundation, is by the work of the critic made quite untenable, and this negative principle must be accepted with all that it implies.

The implications of this principle are of the utmost importance in our practical religious life. It cuts the ground from under a certain easy-going attitude towards modern criticism. It is not uncommon to hear it said that criticism has really made little difference with the Bible, that it has rather strengthened our belief in the Bible. With such vague assertions the fears of the timid are quieted.

As a matter of fact, it would be difficult to exaggerate the revolution which the new attitude to the Bible is bringing over the church. We are only at the very beginning of the change. Only a few scholars today realize what it means; "the general public," as a recent writer has said, "is still unable to recognize any middle ground between the acceptance of the teachings of the Bible as authoritative 'from cover to cover' and the 'rejection' of the Bible." The process from a Bible-religion to the historical conception of Christianity will doubtless be a painful one. What strange forms religion will assume no one can guess, and one might well view with alarm the coming development, were it not for the conviction that the guiding hand of Providence shapes the destinies of the church and in the end the truth will be vindicated.

The practical conclusion of what criticism has achieved is just this, that there can be no certainty of any detail of our gospel story. We cannot say that a given proposition is true because Christ said it, for the reason that we are never sure what Christ really did say. We shall never be able to say of any detail of his life, It happened so and so. Careful research may increase the likelihood of the authenticity of certain passages, but we can never be sure. Who can tell whether the source underlying the common passages of St. Matthew and St. Luke reported correctly? Who can tell what degree of authority St. Peter gives to the Gospel of St. Mark, whom Papias calls Peter's "interpreter"? To this ultimate conclusion, then, of practical uncertainty of details we come as the one assured result of modern criticism.

Fortunately, the details of Christ's life and teaching are not of the most vital importance to the practice of the Christian religion. When we realize that Christ brought no new law, that Christianity is not a code of ethics and the Bible is not a collection of oracles, when we remember that Christianity stands for a few great vital truths, we are ready to let the details go.

For if each detail is uncertain, the same is not true of the mass of details. If no single word or sentence is lifted above doubt, that cannot be said of the whole of all the words and sentences. As regards the general impression of Christ's life, we stand on ground totally different from the evidence for single words or events. We may not be able to trace with accuracy the position and direction of each line, but the picture as a whole is perfectly clear. The figure of Christ, the impression of what he was and meant to be to the world, has stood before mankind these eighteen centuries, and no criticism can destroy that impression. It is here, therefore, in the large features of that unique life, that we find our certainty. Neither can one say, as we trust will become evident in the sequel, that the picture of Christ which the Christian world has enshrined in its heart, is that of the Fourth Gospel, and is therefore faulty, or at least questionable.

The reader will again call to mind what was said at the beginning of this paper: we have here nothing to do with the miraculous

as an element in the life of Christ. We set that quite aside for our present purpose. What we desire to gain is the knowledge of one aspect of what Christ stood for, and we find it not only in what he taught, but in the principles which he embodied in his activity and in his habits of thought. We are far from denying, indeed we strenuously affirm, that the supernatural is an essential element in our conception of Christ, but we claim that Christianity as a religion may be, in theory, separated from Christianity as embodied in certain events in history. The two stand as separate interests of theological inquiry.

And so, guided by the principles as we have stated them, we shall examine the other of the two propositions which we found to underlie this theory of a purely moral Christianity, the proposition that Christ's essential purpose was a moral one.

In order to test this statement we shall endeavor to extract from the gospels a formula which shall express Christ's attitude to life. If we can do this, we shall have satisfied our immediate purpose and shall be able to judge of the correctness of the opposing theory. We shall then go a step further and examine more carefully the leading principles such as they were received and held by the early Church. We shall endeavor to ascertain how far these principles, which we have so far assumed to embody a spiritual as opposed to a moral conception of Christianity, agree with Christ's attitude towards life.

Let us first take the direct teaching of our Lord. Whoever studies this must be impressed with the fact that there is really little direct moral teaching in the record of Christ's activity. Almost all of it is comprised within the Sermon on the Mount. More significant, however, than this is the fact that behind the moral there is usually the recognition of the spiritual. Christ's morality almost invariably has a spiritual coloring or bearing, which leads us to understand that in his mind religion is inseparable from morality.

A few illustrations will make this clear. A modern secular moralist might say that purity of heart is a noble and exalting virtue: Christ says, "The pure in heart shall *see God*." Our social reformers might say that peaceableness is a highly "social" and therefore commendable virtue: Christ says that

peacemakers shall be called the *children of God*. And so with most of Christ's moral exhortations, they have a spiritual point or reference: persecutions shall bring great reward in heaven.—He tells us what sort of righteousness is requisite for admission to the kingdom of heaven; God's love is the measure for ours; God's perfection is the standard for ours. And so on, through the rest of the Sermon, as any one can read. Everywhere we see the traces of Christ's habit of mind, the turning from the earthly to the heavenly, that heavenly-mindedness which is so strikingly expressed in this same Sermon: "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do break through and steal: But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal." It is a hasty judgment that finds in the Sermon on the Mount the kernel of Christianity, and conceives of that discourse as a set of moral aphorisms.

It is undoubtedly an easy task to pick out from Christ's sayings those which appeal to our preconceived ideas of what he represented, and proclaim, Here is the true and genuine gospel. Thus we find it written that Christ said, "As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise," and "I will have mercy and not sacrifice." These and other expressions like them are put forward, and it is claimed that these express the mind of Christ, that this is Christianity.

We call attention to a few other words outside of the Sermon on the Mount, expressing direct moral teaching, which show the same spiritual references. So in the warning against idle words, of which account shall be given in the day of judgment (Matt. 13 36), in the commendation of childlike humility, which makes a man great in the kingdom of heaven (18 4), in the warning against giving offence, where it is better to enter into life halt or maimed rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into everlasting fire, etc. (18 8 f.), in the insistence upon self-denial, where Christ contrasts the material and the spiritual, the world and the soul (Mark 8 36), in the reference of the divorce question to God's intent at the creation (10 6), in the warning against those who lay up treasure for themselves and are not rich towards God (Luke 12 21).

The conception of a morality without religious sanction is in fact wholly out of place as applied to Christ. It attributes to him what is quite foreign to his mind. The Hebrew Wisdom-literature does indeed show us that a secular morality was not unknown among the Jews of Christ's time; but our Lord was certainly untouched by it. To Christ's mind the ethical life was simply the doing of God's will. This is his definition, given with a good deal of distinctness: in Matt. 7 21, "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven"; in the Lord's Prayer, "Thy will be done"; in Matt. 12 50, "Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother and sister and mother." The rule of right living was to Christ not an abstract law, a command appealing to the ethical consciousness of the individual, it was the will of a living Father appealing to the obedience of his children.

All moral relationships are determined by this consideration of man's attitude to God. If right-doing is obedience, wrong-doing is sin, and the gospels know much of sin. Christ began his ministry by preaching repentance and enforced the necessity of repentance, he taught his disciples to pray for forgiveness, he forgave sinners, and in one instance, that of the lame man let down from the roof (Mark 2 5), he seemed to recognize the forgiveness of the man's sins as the necessary preliminary to the recovery of bodily health.

Sin is the offence against a living God, the will of man opposing itself to the will of the heavenly Father, which must be repented of and be forgiven. These ideas are indelibly impressed upon the gospel record, but they have no place in a purely moral system, and one is at a loss to know how their presence in the gospels can be explained by those to whom Christ is no more than a moral reformer. No man could speak of sin, repentance, and forgiveness as Christ did, who was not penetrated through and through with the belief that man's attitude to God is the constitutive principle of life.

Christ's teaching of faith comes within the same category, as arising from a spiritual view of life. The emphasis which the

gospels place on faith is very significant. Faith is recognized or demanded as a condition of healing: in the centurion (Matt. 8 10), the man sick of the palsy (Mark 2 5), the woman with the bloody issue (Matt. 9 22), the blind man (9 29), the woman of Canaan (15 28), the leper (Luke 17 19), the father of the lunatic boy (Mark 9 23), whom Christ tells that "all things are possible to him that believeth." The disciples are rebuked for lack of faith (Mark 4 40) and are taught that faith may remove mountains (Matt. 17 20, 21 21), the woman who was a sinner is commended for her faith (Luke 7 50), and Christ is said to have opened his ministry with a call to repentance and faith in the gospel (Mark 1 15).

What power of faith must there not have been in the mind of him who could calmly say (Mark 11 24) "What things soever ye desire, when ye pray, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have them." What sense of the spiritual strength of faith is there not in the words to the distracted father (Mark 5 36) "Be not afraid, only believe."

One more reference: there is a melancholy recognition of Peter's moral weakness in our Lord's words to him near the end (Luke 22 31), "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat"—and what follows? A hope or prayer that Peter's weak will may be strengthened, his moral nature fortified? Not at all. He who had a true insight into human nature went deeper: "I have prayed for thee that *thy faith* fail not."

Here we find the same evidence as in the moral teaching of the temper of Christ's mind. It is the temper of one who dwells chiefly on the things not seen, who believes in the vital power for human life of spiritual forces.

We have seen that the direct moral teaching is a small element in our gospels. A large proportion of the story is taken up with the accounts of Christ's healings and with the parables, which convey a variety of teaching including the moral and explain the nature and the future of the kingdom of God. Then there are the prophetic discourses.

Among other subjects taught is the infinite value of the human soul, trust in Providence and the love of God: not even a sparrow

falleth to the ground without the Father, and the prodigal son returning is clasped in his father's bosom. These are spiritual, not moral, teachings.

Finally, we read how Christ prayed (Mark 1 35, 6 46, Luke 6 12, 9 18, 28, 11 1, 22 41), how he taught his disciples to pray and enforced his teaching by a parable "to this end that men ought always to pray" (Luke 18 1), and warned them in the Sermon on the Mount against mechanical prayer.

Christ's teaching by parables—interesting in itself as perhaps a unique example of this form of teaching—gives us a most instructive insight into his habit of mind. Their significance is that they show how Christ saw everywhere in the material world types of the spiritual. To interpret the parables as allegories is to misunderstand them. The parable of the Sower has often lost its power, because like an allegory its meaning was supposed to hinge on a translation of each detail, each kind of soil, each feature of the process, into its meaning. Rather, it brings before us a law of the natural world by which Christ would make us understand the analogous process in the spiritual world. And so with the other parables: they show that Christ's mind dwelt in the region of spiritual truths, that to him the things that are seen were but the types of the things that are not seen. All that he saw on earth pointed to heaven. In the ways of men and of things he saw a visible embodiment of what obtained in the other world, invisible but to him most real.

Christ began his ministry with the announcement that the kingdom of God was at hand (Mark 1 15) and to establish the kingdom of God was the great object of his endeavor. It represented, if we may say so, our Lord's philosophy of history. We moderns have heard much of the "onward march of civilization"; "social progress" is on every tongue; "evolution" is a commonplace of our talk. All these represent modern ways of thinking. Christ too had his views of society, his notions of progress. They differed from those of our professors of sociology chiefly in that they were religious. The kingdom of God takes its beginning on earth, its consummation is in heaven. God is the directive power in this conception of society, and the moving forces in its realization are spiritual.

Finally, we may consider one more fact in Christ's mental life. There is one passage in our gospels which opens to our view an insight into our Lord's mental attitude towards the beauties of nature. The reference of course is to Matt. 6 28: "Consider the lilies of the field how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: and yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these." As the passage is unique of its kind, it is worth while to observe that it occurs in substantially the same form in St. Luke (12 27) and therefore must have been derived from the source underlying St. Matthew and St. Luke and shares whatever authority attaches to this document.

Christ claims for the common wayside flower—our daisy or dandelion—a beauty which casts the greatest earthly glory in the shade. Such an appreciation of beauty is rare. It requires the high soul of a Wordsworth to open modern eyes to the beauty of every-day things; surely here is where the poet learned his lesson.

We have in our own time opened once more the book of nature and we are learning to know nature's beauty. In the literature that has grown up around this topic there is no more deeply cut dividing line than that which marks off the mere physical from the spiritual appreciation of beauty. There is a world's remove between those souls who rejoice only in the richness of coloring and the perfection of outline and those in whose eyes color and form are the mysterious adumbrations of that which is beyond the veil. Where did Christ stand? The next verse tells: "*If God so clothe the grass of the field, which today is, and tomorrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?*" From the lily his mind rose to the creator of the lily, earth's beauty pointed him to heaven.

In searching the records for that which was uppermost in the mind of Christ, we have, except in the last instance, disregarded the question of authority for each separate quotation. This is in accordance with the principle which we laid down. Not one of the sayings of Christ comes to us with the seal of surety, each stands under question as to its authenticity. But there can hardly be a doubt, when so many indications point to the same conclusion, when such a multitude of references, so many lines of in-

quiry, lead to the same result, that the features of Christ's mental life are and remain fixed and determined.

We have seen the many-sided testimony to the spiritual in Christ's mind and intention, against which can be set, as arguing a purely moral Christ, only a few ethical aphorisms, some of the beatitudes, the golden rule, and a few other sentences. It is impossible to account for such a consensus of testimony to the predominantly spiritual character of Christ's views and his habits of thought, unless behind the testimony lies the fact. For that Christ's words and acts should have been so laboriously falsified with the intent of making him out different from what he was, or that a picture so harmonious in its details should have been the result of fortuitous accretions,—either of these theories is for sober historical research simply out of the question.

Is it possible—we now ask—to express this spiritual element in Christ's revelation in a single phrase? In answer to this question we venture to suggest that *the spirituality of life* expresses that for which Christ stood, both in his teaching and by every other manifestation of his mind.

Mankind has found in Christ the hope and promise of a future life. He has "brought life and immortality to light." But we recognize that Christ's attitude towards the question of immortality is very different from that which we moderns occupy. Christ did not make the distinction between the present and the future life as we do. Our notions of "another life" were alien to him, and when he was asked a question about the "resurrection" such as we might ask him, his answer shows that he was not at home in that way of thinking: "As touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living" (Matt. 22 31 f.).

The difference is that our views are secular, Christ's were spiritual. To us the physical universe, what we call the hard facts of life, are the substantial realities; to Christ the deeper realities were the life of the soul, the groping for the higher, the desire for divine fellowship, all that part of human nature which testifies to a something more substantial, more abiding, than

what we know with our senses. It is this spiritual appreciation of life, with its endless outlook, an appreciation which carries with it the full acknowledgment of moral obligation, but which lifts morality into the higher sphere, where it is obedience: herein we find what is distinctive in Christ's attitude towards human nature, and such we believe is in the main the impression of Christ which the world's best instincts have accepted.

We pass on to inquire whether to this picture which the gospels draw of Christ there is a correspondence in the belief of the first Christians. Do they agree with Christ? Is the Christian conception of human life in the New Testament outside the gospels the same as that recorded of Christ?

There could hardly be a perfect agreement. If we remember how the light of religious truth is always broken by the prism of individual minds, how the quality of faith varies with personal characteristics, with the disposition, with the needs of the individual soul, we shall realize how impossible it is to expect an exact agreement between the conceptions of Christ and the conceptions of the first Christians. But when we have recorded the variations, we shall see whether essentially the same estimate of life does not underlie the other conceptions and that of Christ alike.

The first History of the Church gives us little help in defining the Christianity of the first generation. We have already seen that the Acts of the Apostles, in the early chapters, before the author turns to the history of St. Paul, records the announcement of the resurrection as the burden of the apostolic message. This was the one overwhelmingly important fact to those who had just become aware of it, and it was natural that it should fill their minds and leave little room for reflection as to its meaning. Christ had risen: that one great fact was the first to be proclaimed to the world and it wins our confidence in the Acts that it tells the story just as we should expect it to have happened.

We turn to St. Paul. We have already spoken of the theory which isolated St. Paul and made him antagonistic to the original Christian faith. This theory represents an aberration of modern criticism. A good deal of the apostle's reasoning is doubtless peculiar to himself. It is also true that St. Paul had his enemies

while he lived, that he was bitterly assailed in a later generation, and that the Church at large perhaps never rose to his high level. Yet in the spirituality of his teaching he stands by no means isolated, and we may certainly take him as one of the representatives of the Christianity of the first church.

In St. Paul we have to separate between the reflective theological reasoning and the record of his personal intimate spiritual experience. St. Paul's theology has been an important factor in the history of Christian thought. But it is not so much through his theological reflections as by his spiritual experience that he has so profoundly influenced the spiritual history of the world, and it is in these spiritual experiences, not in the reasoned deductions from them, that we shall find what Christianity was to St. Paul.

For our purposes therefore we must consider such passages as these:

Rom. 8 35 ff.: Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? shall tribulation or distress or persecution or famine, or nakedness or peril or sword? . . . Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors.

1 Cor. 15 57 f.: Thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast.

2 Cor. 5 17: If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new.

Gal. 5 1: Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free" [if this is the correct translation].

Phil. 3 8, 13 f.: I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord. . . . This one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press towards the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus.

1 Tim. 1 15: This is a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.

If we compare St. Paul's spiritual attitude, as these and other like quotations bring it before us, with that of our Lord, we shall see that the two are not altogether homogeneous. Between the mind of Christ and the mind of St. Paul there is a great difference. Two new factors enter and differentiate St. Paul from Christ. The first is his personal relation to Christ. The

fact that he had found a saviour in Christ, that Christ had become to him the heaven-sent means to a new life, filled his soul. The second factor in St. Paul's religion was the consciousness of deliverance from the weight of sin, the sense of Christian liberty.

And yet, underneath these individual variations, the groundwork of St. Paul's conception, that which was deepest and underlay all else in his soul, was the same as that which was in Christ's mind. There is everywhere the same pervading sense of the spirituality of life. He had found the new life, the life of the spirit. The consciousness of a heaven, which had lain smothered under the killing weight of the Pharisaic system, leapt into flame at the touch of Christ. Like his master he found his home in the larger world, in which death is but an episode and in which the law is a loving obedience. He was "a new creature in Christ," his "conversation was in heaven," he "walked not after the flesh but after the spirit," he walked in "newness of life," and served in "newness of spirit," the "high calling of God in Christ Jesus" beckoned him, the law of the spirit of life in Christ had made him "free from the law of sin and death," he knew "the glorious liberty of the children of God."

We have made no difference between the traditional thirteen epistles. They all share essentially the same spiritual conceptions, and if some are from other hands, there is added so much more testimony to the spirituality of early Christianity.

The writings of St. Paul have had a striking history. That, with all the opposition to him and the lack of appreciation, so many of his writings should have found their place in the canon, to be a perpetual witness to the true nature of Christianity, is surely a mark of providential guidance. And his influence throughout the centuries at the turning-points of Church history is most impressive. We learn how it was the recurrence to the religious principles of St. Paul that caused the better mind of the Church to return once and again from a Christian legalism to the spiritual appreciation of Christianity. For it was the deep spirituality of St. Paul, together with his proclamation of freedom in the spirit, that became the mainspring of religious reformations.

If, in the present uncertainty of the question, we may not accept the Fourth Gospel as a source for the study of Christ's life, yet the writings which go under the name of St. John serve as embodying a conception of Christianity current at the close of the first century. For our purpose we include the Apocalypse, with this reservation that, if it is by another pen, its spiritual view of the Christian life throws another weight into the scales in behalf of our contention.

As with St. Paul, so with St. John: we see at once that a certain factor enters in and colors his conceptions. For, although we may not hastily subscribe to the ready assumptions of many critics of the Fourth Gospel, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that some of the recorded words bear witness to the influence of Hellenic thought.

With other differences between St. John and the Synoptic Gospels, differences in the mode of presentation and the light thrown upon Jesus, we have here no concern. What we have to deal with is his conception of the Christian life, modified as it is through the influence of Hellenic ways of thinking. But if we abstract this alien ingredient, if we allow for the emphasis placed upon truth and knowledge, we find in the Johannine writings an intensified insistence upon the spirituality of life.

In the Synoptic Gospels the governing tendency of Christ's mind is betrayed by many unconscious indications. In St. John's writings the spirituality of the present life is expressed in direct and decided language: "This is eternal life that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent" (17 3); "He that heareth my word and believeth on him that sent me hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life. . . . The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live" (5 24 f.); "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die" (11 25 f.); "We know that we have passed from death unto life because we love the brethren" (I 3 14); "He that hath the Son hath life" (I 5 12); "I will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely" (Rev.

21 6); "Whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely" (21 17).

Neither here nor in St. Paul does the spiritual exclude the moral, but both in St. Paul and in St. John the controlling conception of the Christian life is spiritual, and the spirituality of St. John is only more emphatically expressed than that of Christ according to the Synoptic Gospels.

We next take up the First Epistle of St. Peter. The freshness and spontaneity of this writing are most naturally explained by assuming the correctness of the tradition which ascribes it to the apostle. If the difficulties which it presents forbid this conclusion, it must have come from one who stood very close to the original source of the Christian revelation. As all other writings, so this epistle reflects the conditions of the times. Persecutions turned the eyes of the suffering Christians to the future rewards, when the trial of their faith "might be found unto praise and honor and glory at the appearing of Jesus Christ" (1 7). There are moral exhortations, advice to servants, wives, and husbands, and admonitions to the elders. But throughout there runs the same ground-tone, the joyful recognition of the new life in Christ. They were elect "in sanctification of the spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ" (1 2); they were "born again" (1 23), were "built up a spiritual house" (2 5). Morality, as in the gospels, is obedience to God; they were to live, not "in the flesh to the lusts of men, but to the will of God" (4 2).

The Epistle of St. James stands by itself. As has already been indicated, its preponderating interest is moral, the spiritual is secondary.

It is not necessary to dwell upon Second Peter and Jude. They doubtless belong to a later time, and their polemic shows an advanced tendency, perhaps justified in all but its bitterness, away from the early simplicity towards a desire for orthodoxy. Otherwise their tone is not alien to the atmosphere of spirituality of the other writings.

In the Epistle to the Hebrews, finally, we meet with another very marked tendency of the early times, which somewhat later found a leading exponent in the Epistle of Barnabas, the ten-

dency which looked upon the new religion as the perfection of the old, which dwelt upon prophecies and types and their fulfilment. But apart from this the Epistle to the Hebrews presents the same spiritual Christianity. Christ delivers "them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage" (2 15); he "became the author of salvation" (5 9); Christians are "partakers of the heavenly calling," "partakers of Christ" (3 1, 14), are bidden to "come boldly unto the throne of grace" (4 16); they "have tasted of the heavenly gift" and "the powers of the world to come" (6 4, 5); Christ has "obtained eternal redemption for us" (9 12), and we have "boldness to enter into the holy place by the blood of Jesus" (10 19).

We need not go beyond the limits of the New Testament in our present examination; the canonical books are sufficient to make known to us what were the motive forces of the new religion. We have learned that each writing shows a personal factor, but that underlying this personal element there is, with one possible exception, the common recognition of the spirituality of life, and that in this they are in agreement with what we found to be the mind of Christ.

This conclusion—as must be evident to all unbiassed minds—but confirms the estimate in which the sober sense of men has commonly held the New Testament, especially in these modern times since it has become an open book. It has not stood for a code of morality, but it has stood for a life of "otherworldliness" (to use a newly coined, expressive word). What we found to be the deeper realities in the mind of Christ, the human aspirations for the heavenly ideal, are the realities which the New Testament as a whole has impressed upon the world. In this volume the best minds of the Christian generations have found the seal of approval upon their higher instincts; it has led men to know themselves as moral beings,—yes, but as much more, as beings accountable to God, as owners of a dignity with which the earth is not commensurate. The New Testament has brought to the sons of men the consciousness that they are the heirs of a larger inheritance, that they may lay claim to it now, that, while the physical part of man passes away, the spiritual lives forever, and it has ever called men to a life worthy of man's high destiny.

The early church did not maintain the spiritual level of the New Testament. A difference in tone soon begins to pervade the Christian literature. St. James had his successors, who placed more and more emphasis upon the moral. A process of deterioration began. There came to be a separation of two things which belong together. The spiritual was removed to the future and was recognized only as the promise of coming glory. The spirituality of the present was lost sight of. This life came to be conceived solely as under the moral law, though that moral law was still thought of as the will of God.

There began the fatal disruption of the Christian life: the ethical command on the one hand, and on the other the sanction of promised rewards and punishments, while the irrepressible spiritual nature turned to superstition to indemnify itself. For many centuries the Christian life was, for the masses of people, confined within the categories of command and retribution, and as a result the Christian religion has been charged with teaching a morality dependent upon future rewards and punishments. The injurious effects of this tendency have been felt even to our own time, and it has helped to obscure Christian spirituality.

Today new motives have come into play, and the chief cause of the moral interpretation of Christianity in our own time has been humanitarian zeal, desire for the improvement of man's condition, and for the healing of the terrible sores which afflict human society. It is a fine enthusiasm, but its one-sided ardor has narrowed its vision and has led it into serious misapprehensions. Its mistake is twofold. It fails to see that humanity presents deeper and more permanent questions to be solved than those of social improvement—what were the saving social truths to those who suffered in the Messina catastrophe?—and that Christianity is what it is today because it responds to the ultimate questions of life.

Moreover, it fails to grasp the fact that there can be no lasting and effective moral enthusiasm which has not its mainspring in the life of the spirit, the life which is at home in the higher realities. The history of the Christian centuries may be scanned from beginning to end, and no great moral reformation will be

discovered which was not based upon a religious revival, and it is idle to look for such in the future. What our human problems call for above all else is strength of character, and there can be no lasting strength of character which does not know repentance, forgiveness, and faith.

We shall quote the opinion of one whose comprehensive mind and large historic sympathy, added to the keenest critical insight, have given him a unique position in our generation. In his chapter on St. Augustine Professor Harnack says: "It is true that since the days of Leibnitz and the Illumination there has arisen a mighty opponent [to the religious conceptions of St. Augustine], an enemy who seemed for a century to have gained the upper hand, which reduced the Christian religion, so far as it allowed the latter any validity, to energetic action, and assigned to it the part of a joyous optimism, a mode of thinking which removed the living God to a distance and subordinated the religious to the ethical—but in our century this foe yielded, at least within the churches, to the power of the old conception" (*Dogmengeschichte*, iii, p. 66).

This paper has been written to prove that the conception of Christianity of which Harnack here speaks, and which he holds to be fatal to the highest interests of humanity, is contradictory of the religion of Christ and the apostles.

The question with which we have dealt ought to find its definite settlement in thoughtful and candid minds. It is aside from the problem of Christ's person and authority. That question will always receive different answers, because it involves the balancing of spiritual values which are beyond the reach of logical appeal.

But our problem is a purely historical and wholly intellectual one, and therefore it admits of a final conclusion. We submit that for the student of the early literature there is only one answer possible to the question which heads this article.

## THEORIES AND BELIEFS

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In an essay entitled "The Scepticism of Believers," Leslie Stephen remarks a common confusion between *unbelief* and *contrary* belief. The term "belief" is at any historical moment almost invariably used to denote the established belief, that is, the belief supported by authority or by the consensus of opinion; while the term "unbelief" is used to denote dissent from the established belief, even when, as is most often the case, this dissent is itself due to belief. The established belief resists change, and must be attacked, weakened, or destroyed, before it is possible for another belief to get a hearing; hence assenters come to regard dissenters as destructive in their primary intent, and are blinded to the fact that there is another belief at stake, which may be as affirmative and constructive in its own terms as that which prevails. Thus modern religious orthodoxy has condemned as unbelief a certain secular tendency, which really has arisen, not from a love of mischief-making, but from a most devoted confidence in the uniformity of nature, and in the power of man to save himself. It is not wholly unjust to assert, as Leslie Stephen does assert, that, in opposing the free advance of science and of individualism, defenders of "the Faith" have virtually sought to prevent or destroy that faith in the enterprise of civilization which has mainly inspired the progress of the last two centuries.

But for our present purposes the significance of this lies not in the issue between warring beliefs, both of which are positive and confident, but in the issue between belief, which puts heart into men, and that state of suspended animation, of hesitation and general impotence, which is properly to be regarded as unbelief. "The man has most faith, in the sense in which faith represents a real force," says our author, "whose convictions are

such as are most favorable to energetic action, and is freest from the doubts which paralyze the will in the great moments of life. He must have a clear vision of an end to be achieved, devotion to which may be the ruling passion of his life and the focus to which all his energies may converge.”<sup>1</sup>

In the present discussion, I use the phrase “established belief” to denote faith in this sense of *conviction favorable to action*; and it is my purpose to show that the opposite state of mind, unbelief, or the lack of convictions favorable to action, may be induced by *theory*. To avoid even a momentary misunderstanding, let me say at once that belief and theory are inseparable. Theory must necessarily have to do with the environment, and therefore cannot fail to be of practical significance. Theory is the ultimate source not only of knowledge, but of practical enlightenment and skill as well. Similarly, every belief is virtually a theoretical assertion, liable to correction or confirmation by science. Nevertheless, the difference between theory and belief is not only real, but of the greatest human importance. Before theory can become belief it must be assimilated to a plan of life; it must be not only asserted, but also adopted. And when belief becomes theory, it means that an integral component of some man’s plan of life is withdrawn; making it necessary that his hand should be stayed, and the plan suspended, if not permanently abandoned. Without a recognition of this radical difference between theory and belief, unless it be understood that as moods, states of mind, or moments of life, they are almost antithetical, one must remain blind to the real tragedy of heresy and doubt.

The virtue of belief lies in the application. Knowledge does not become belief until it is presupposed for the purposes of action. This holds equally of the most elementary common sense, of technical skill, and of religious piety. Common sense consists of the manifold things that can be *taken for granted* for the purposes of everyday life. Common sense must be true to be useful; but it would still not be useful unless it were habitually and implicitly trusted. Technical skill is derived from science; but until scientific principles are sufficiently well established to be relied on, they cannot be applied. And piety, if it

<sup>1</sup> Leslie Stephen, *An Agnostic’s Apology*, p. 50.

be not constant, if a life be not founded on it, is not that good thing which is called religion. He who makes plans for the morrow, or constructs a bridge, or prays to God, *believes*. There is, then, a *specific value in belief* over and above the value of truth which it must have in common with knowledge. This value is that confidence and steadiness, without which no consecutive endeavor is possible. And since this is the case, it follows that there is a legitimate and powerful incentive to belief, which may be distinguished from the love of truth. So that they are not wholly unreasonable who resent being robbed of their belief, or, seeking to have it restored, pray God to help their unbelief.

Now it is clear that theory can no more take the place of belief than a stone can take the place of bread. Theory does not directly nourish and sustain life, as belief does; because, unlike belief, it does not suit the humor of action. To theorize is to doubt. The investigator must be both incredulous and credulous, believing nothing, and prepared to believe anything. While he remains theoretically-minded, he remains open-minded, receptive to evidence, committing himself to assertions only tentatively or provisionally. He may be preparing foundations, but he cannot let them stand, and hence is not free to build on them. Furthermore, for the very reason that the theorist is not expected to put his theories into practice, he enjoys a certain irresponsibility. To him is allotted the task of examining a question on its merits, without reference to ulterior motives. He is permitted a certain play of conjecture, a certain oscillation of mind between hypothetical alternatives, that is fatal to administrative competence. Nor is the theoretical mind held to those standards of proportionateness which obtain in life. The scientist is not uncommonly likened to Professor James's "myopic ant," who tumbles into every microscopic crack and fissure, and never suspects that a centre exists. But fatal as such procedure would be to the proper conduct of life, it is neither unworthy nor unfruitful as an incident of theoretical analysis. Chesterton has remarked that "a man does not go mad because he builds a statue a mile high, but he may go mad by thinking it out in square inches."<sup>2</sup> In the latter case, judged by the standards of

<sup>2</sup> Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, p. 67.

social efficiency, the man *is* mad; but his madness is explained, or adjudged not madness after all, when it is recognized that his interest is theoretical. And a similar allowance is made for a certain difference of pace in life and in theory. There is a maxim to the effect that "he that will believe only what he can fully comprehend, must have a very long head or a very short creed." In other words, when theoretically-minded, one proceeds as though life permitted of being invariably guided by good and manifest reasons; whereas practically, if one were to adopt such a principle, one would never reach the first milestone. Intelligent living proceeds not by doubting, examining, experimenting, and proving, but by assuming. There is an urgency and brevity about life that makes it impossible that one should give the rein to one's critical powers or weigh every affirmation in the delicate balance of logic.

I hope it is clear that I am not attempting to divide men into believers and theorists. I am distinguishing not between classes of men, but between characteristic moods or states of mind. The difference, however, is not so much psychological as it is moral. There is a different motive in theory and in belief, a different human good. Hence it follows that these moods may confront one another dramatically both in individual life and in the history of society. There is a party of theory and a party of belief, with a loyalty to each. It happens that in our own time there is more need of emphasizing the motive of belief. We live in a rationalistic age, many of us in a rationalistic fellowship or community, and incline to the party of theory. It is the mark of such partisanship to suppose that advocates of established belief are moved to suspect or resist innovation only by stubbornness or inertia. On the contrary, conservatism is not less passionate than radicalism, nor less moved by the love of good. For the advocate of established belief is the advocate of established life; of that present adjustment of interests which is daily tested and proved, and to which the great majority of men are wholly and irrevocably committed. It is less enlightened to despise him as the enemy of truth than to pay him some respect as the friend of peace and order.

Belief is a psychological and moral necessity, more indispen-

sable to life than hunger or sympathy. But we shall not understand the strength of this motive or the part which it plays in the vital economy until we recognize its *corporate* character. An established belief possesses a value proportional to the number of interests invested in it. And this solidarity of belief manifests itself on every scale, individual, social, and historical. It has been said that every man of action is a fatalist. This is due to the need of a permanence of belief, if the several acts of an individual life are to contribute to one end. A plan of action, in proportion to its scope, requires time and manifold agencies for its execution, and must be adhered to from moment to moment and from act to act. But every plan of action is based on innumerable assumptions concerning the natural and social environment; and if these assumptions be questioned, the plan is virtually suspended. Action is efficient in proportion to its range, and the greater its range the more necessary is it that its components should be rigid and stable. Assumptions must be trusted implicitly, in order that one may be free to leave them behind one's back and face the work to be done.

The larger the enterprise, the greater the need of a fixed orientation, of a view that shall not dissolve until a thousand tributary agencies have been assembled, coördinated, and made jointly and cumulatively to achieve the designated end. It follows that a steadiness of belief is more indispensable to social than to individual action. Every variety of coöperation requires that men shall occupy common ground. The best partners, like the best friends, are those who can take the most for granted. That which is true of every lesser social enterprise is supremely true of politics and religion. The arm of society is the institution, and this owes its power to a wide-spread community of belief. The institution is the most delicate and complicated mechanism of life, constructed out of the purposes and convictions of innumerable individuals. And this mechanism cannot remain intact, and be the instrument that it is designed to be, unless the parts be firm and durable. In short, society could not act, for the maintenance of order or the promotion of civilization, if men's ideas were fluent and transitory. This does not mean merely that social action would be hampered, but that any

political or organized community whatsoever would be impossible. Unbelief is equally fatal to the full benefit of religion. That benefit is realized only when a firm conviction concerning the ultimate source of human fortune, or the supreme object of devotion, dominates and unifies all the varied activities of life. This benefit is never fully attained; but so far as it has been attained, it has given to civilization something of the sweetness and vigor of health. When science and art, common sense and mystical ecstasy, the outer manner and the inner propensity, in all men different and yet in all alike, do but embroider and enact one theme, the circle is closed and the strength of man made perfect. And such unanimity of imagination and enthusiasm, quickening and ennobling the concert of action, must rest on unseen but deep-laid foundations of common belief.

There remains one further proof of the solidarity of belief. If society is to act effectively, it must remain in agreement with itself not only breadthwise but also lengthwise. The temporal continuity of civilization is the indispensable condition of progress. When fundamental convictions are altered, it is much like moving to a new planet; the work must be begun all over again. Apparently the conquests of civilization are gained by swift and sudden victories. But revolution is only the beginning of reformation. It is the slow process of reorganization and education that saves the fruits of such victories, and constitutes that steady if almost imperceptible advance on which the hope of civilization must mainly rely. In order that this shall be possible, it is necessary that beliefs should be transmitted together with problems and opportunities. Unless the burden is to fall, the young must not only grasp what the old have let go, but they must obtain the same foothold.

There are, then, *systems of belief* which condition effective, concerted, and progressive living. Such systems, it may be further remarked, have their more and their less vital parts. There are some beliefs which, like the keystone of the arch or the base of the pyramid, cannot be dislodged without overthrowing the whole structure. If there be a good in all belief, that good will be greater in such beliefs; and if there be a motive which rallies men to the support of any belief, men will be moved

most passionately when such beliefs are at stake. For these are the beliefs most built upon, to which men are most committed, and in which they have invested all their possessions. When they are shaken, it is like the trembling of the solid earth.

Unless, in spite of all prepossessions to the contrary, in spite of a justifiable impatience with every obstacle to progress, we can see a certain rightness and sound loyalty in conservatism, we shall remain blind to the meaning of the great transitional eras. Thus we are swift to condemn the Inquisition of the seventeenth century, and the compromises of Galileo and Descartes. The catholic orthodoxy of the time has been proved wrong, cruelly and fatuously wrong; and Galileo and Descartes lost an opportunity of displaying the heroism of Bruno and Spinoza. But a powerful motive of the drama will have been reduced to a nullity, if it be supposed that the Holy Office was prompted only by malice, or Galileo and Descartes by cowardice.

Galileo, it will be remembered, was convicted of holding that the earth moved. This doctrine was declared to be "absurd, heretical, contrary to the text of Scripture"; and Galileo was compelled to repudiate it. He defended himself on the ground that Scripture was not science. "Hence it appears," he said, "that when we have to do with natural effects brought under our eyes by the experience of our senses, or deduced from absolute demonstrations, these can in no wise be called in question on the strength of Scripture texts that are susceptible of a thousand different interpretations, for the words of Scripture are not so strictly limited in their significance as the phenomena of nature."<sup>3</sup> But this defence left out of consideration what was referred to in the charge as the "absurdity" and "heretical" character of the new theory. It was not its contradiction of Scripture texts that made it dangerous, but its contradiction of the prevailing belief. This was definitely committed to the immobility of the earth, and in concluding that the Copernican theory, advocated by Galileo, was a menace to it, the Holy Office was not mistaken.

But why should the immobility of the earth be a cherished belief, to be protected by the penalty of death? Men are not

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Mézières, "Trial of Galileo," *Popular Science Monthly*, vol. x, p. 389.

soberly burned at the stake, or submitted to torment by due process of law, out of sheer bloodthirstiness, or on account of trivial offences. It must all appear childish and wanton unless we can learn to recognize the immense human importance which once attached to what is now regarded only as an obsolete astronomy. For it was not merely that men wondered how, if the sun did not move, Joshua could have commanded it to stand still; the Copernican theory contradicted the entire practical orientation that dominated the imagination and justified the plans of Christendom. Never in the history of European civilization has common sense been so comprehensive and so highly unified as it was in Galileo's day. That synopsis of heaven and earth which was the theme of Dante's *Divine Comedy*, and the fundamental thesis of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae*, was not an esoteric truth, but an illumination shared by common men, and revealing to them the objects of their daily hopes and fears. The earth was the centre of a compact and finite created world. It was prepared by the hand of God for man's habitation, and surrounded by sun, moon, and stars for his convenience and delight. God himself dwelt at the periphery of the system, where he could observe and regulate the human drama enacted at the centre. Man's fall and redemption were the very theme of nature, the key to its interpretation; and the earth as the scene of these transactions was its true centre. Now let it be remembered that this image of nature was vividly present to the common mind, portrayed in every form of art, repeatedly implied in the postures of religious observance, and daily represented in common speech and gesture. And let it be remembered furthermore, that this was an age in which secular and religious beliefs were not sharply divorced; when what men believed in particular was subordinated to what they believed on the whole, and when, in spite of a growing worldliness, men could never wholly forget the saving of their souls. Is it any wonder, then, that men were shocked when they heard it said that the earth moved, that it was only the loose swinging satellite of a sun that was but one of many suns? When the Christian imagination has never in the centuries that have followed been able entirely to adapt itself to a decentralized and infinite cosmos, with its

limitless plurality of worlds, is it any wonder that a Christian of the early seventeenth century should have been unable to face such a hypothesis? For a dozen centuries Europeans had been growing accustomed to the world of the Biblical and Ptolemaic imagination; this was for all practical purposes now *their* world, in which they had built their home and laid their plans, and which was endeared to them by every tradition and association. Surely, whatever the Inquisition may have been guilty of, it was not tyranny; for it was the instrument with which this age thought to protect itself and every good thing which it owned.

When I bring myself to feel the force of these considerations, I am convinced that the tragedy of Galileo is not so simple as is sometimes supposed. Neither he nor his accusers could have enjoyed an undivided mind. As they were not the wicked enemies of truth, so he was not a reckless iconoclast forced to keep silence from fear of physical torture. For both must have felt the conflict between loyalty to the existing order and assent to theoretical truth. The difference lay rather in the relative strength of the two motives. The officers of the church were in a position of responsibility; Galileo, in the quiet and isolation of the Belvedere, could free his mind from the thought of social consequences, while dealing with "natural effects brought under our eyes by the experience of our senses."

After his first trial Galileo attempted to avoid the charge of disturbing the common belief by publishing his astronomical studies in the form of *Dialogues on the Two Great Systems of the Universe*. In these dialogues the merits of both systems are argued, with the result that, while the advocate of the traditional system is the nominal victor, the evidence for the Copernican system is actually more convincing to any one qualified to judge. This was undoubtedly an attempt to satisfy the general public by proclaiming in a loud voice, "The earth does not move," while at the same time whispering to his fellow-augurs, "but *we* know that it really does move." Galileo was by no means incapable of such a stroke, and it was their resentment at what they regarded as a bold trick that inspired Galileo's accusers with the bitterness which they manifested at his second trial.

But taken in the light of the real conflict of motives which Galileo must have felt, and in the light of the policy pursued by other men by no means so witty and adroit as he, may we not believe that these dialogues were in part conceived as a serious attempt to reconcile theory and belief? Galileo was not a revolutionist, but he was jealous of his scientific reputation. He wished to be true to the standards of exact research and at the same time avoid disturbing the public peace. And so he proposed to regard his scientific conclusions as "hypothetical," meaning that they were abstracted from belief. He thought that science might be permitted to go its own way, and freely entertain any idea that might recommend itself on purely theoretical grounds, provided that society could be protected from the premature attempt to put such ideas into practice. Society believes, the scientist affirms; they do so on different grounds, and with different values at stake. It would be wise, then, to separate the theoretical and believing processes. They cannot, it is true, be absolutely separated, nor would that be desirable even if it were possible; but they can be regarded as different functions of society and prevented from directly interfering with one another.

If I am mistaken in attributing such reflections as these to Galileo, there can at least be no doubt in the case of Descartes. The news of Galileo's conviction in 1633 reached Descartes just as he was in the act of publishing his *De Mundo*, in which he maintained the doctrine of the motion of the earth. Although, as Descartes himself afterwards affirmed, this doctrine was essential to his whole philosophy of nature, he at once abandoned the project. And when he returned to the topic in [his *Principles of Philosophy* he had found a way to reconcile his theory with the accepted belief. He defined motion as "the transporting of one part of matter or of one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it, or which we regard as at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies."<sup>4</sup> Now, according to the Cartesian theory of planetary motion, the planet is embedded in a fluid which sweeps vortex-fashion round the sun. It follows that, while the vortex does move, the planet, in this

<sup>4</sup> Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, trans. by Veitch, p. 245.

case the earth, does not move, since it remains fixed in relation to the matter immediately adjacent to it.

Now why should Descartes attach importance to what we do not hesitate to call a quibble? Is it merely a proof of timidity and disingenuousness? Descartes was not, it is true, of the stuff of which martyrs are made; but he was nevertheless a man of more than average courage, and of eminent intellectual honesty. The explanation lies elsewhere. He did not pander to his age for purposes of private advantage; but he did sympathize with his age, and he did desire practically to identify himself with it. The motion of the earth meant to his age much what the abandonment of the institution of marriage or of the principles of democracy would mean to ours; it was a symbol of failure and of return to chaos. That Descartes was profoundly concerned at the conflict between theory and belief, between that intellectual freedom which was the condition of truth and that uniformity of sentiment which was the condition of social stability, is proved beyond doubt by the most personal of his writings, the famous *Discourse on Method*. There he concludes that just as when we propose to rebuild the house in which we live, we must nevertheless occupy some quarters while the work is going on, so it is necessary to believe practically, even when the theoretical judgment is suspended. Descartes proposes, therefore, to regulate his practice conformably to the opinions of those with whom he has to live. And since neither society nor the individual can make progress if they are forever examining the ground at their feet, he proposes for practical purposes to adhere steadfastly even to doubtful opinions once they are adopted; "imitating in this the example of travellers who, when they have lost their way in a forest, ought not to wander from side to side, far less remain in one place, but proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as possible, . . . for in this way, if they do not exactly reach the point they desire, they will come at least in the end to some place that will probably be preferable to the middle of a forest."<sup>5</sup>

Galileo and Descartes were divided against themselves through feeling the weight of two great human motives, rationalism and

<sup>5</sup> Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, trans. by Veitch, p. 25.

conservatism. Bruno, Campanella, Ramus, and Vanini, having identified themselves more uncompromisingly with the first of these motives, antagonized the second and were overwhelmed by it. The history of these six men testifies, not to the cruelty and duplicity of human nature, but to the almost unconquerable resistance of an idea which society has built into its foundations.

If established belief be an instance of conservatism, of that loyalty to a dominant system that springs from a large investment of interest, it follows that the right and necessity of a revolution of opinion is comparable to the right and necessity of political revolution. It cannot be denied, it is an indispensable condition of progress, but it is not lightly to be assumed. Revolution is always a doubtful expedient; and the justification of it comes only with the lapse of time. Some revolutionists, like Socrates, Bruno, and Rousseau, are the heroes of mankind, others are its petty mischief-makers.

It may be thought that established belief, like the ruling polity, is capable of taking care of itself. Without doubt there is a heavy inertia in belief, that saves it from being too easily overthrown. Not only are new ideas distrusted by those whose enterprises they threaten to discredit; but they have difficulty even in gaining access to the mind. They must always meet and overcome the charge of "absurdity" that bespeaks the settled habits of common sense. The author of the *Religio Medici* shows a charming indifference to the absurdities of his day. They are so remote from common sense that they may be tolerated without fear of any consequences for life. "Some," he says, "have held that Snow is black, that the earth moves, that the Soul is air, fire, water; but all this is Philosophy, and there is no delirium." In his *Hearts of Men*, Fielding tells us that "all men who have lived to a certain age have learnt that there are certain facts, certain experiences not at all connected with the supernatural, which they dare not tell of for fear of being put down as inventors. . . . Just as the old woman was ready to accept her travelled son's yarns of rivers of milk and islands of cheese; but when he deviated into the truth she stopped. 'Na, na!' she said, 'that the anchor fetched up one of Pharaoh's char-

iot wheels out of the Red Sea, I can believe; but that fish fly! Na, na! dinna come any o' your lies over yer mither.'"<sup>6</sup>

But it is worthy of remark that common sense is not to be conjured with as it once was. We have grown first accustomed to absurdities, and then fond of them. I am not sure that in our day the burden of proof does not lie with the familiar fact. We expect to be surprised, and are suspicious of a theory that lacks novelty. This has doubtless always been the case with *les intellectuels*, but it is fast becoming a general state of mind. Many reasons may be offered for the change. First of all, it is due to the high conductivity of modern society. The state of one individual mind is transmitted with incredible rapidity to the entire community. The doubts, conjectures, and conclusions of theorists are promptly communicated to the public, which straightway itself strikes a theoretical attitude. Again, the general triumph of democratic principles has made a difference here. Intellectual exclusiveness does not suit the temper of liberal societies. It must be share and share alike with knowledge as with other commodities. The best is none too good for every man; hence there can be no living on the paternalistic bounty of a class of wise men. It was once thought that if the eyes of a few were opened, they might lead the rest; but now none consent to remain blind. And, finally, the humanitarian and utilitarian sentiment requires that all knowledge shall promptly be put to use. In order that men may be saved by it, or the conditions of life bettered, or mankind be brought a step forward, knowledge must be instantly worked into life and made to serve.

All these and other tendencies of the day conspire to produce an impatience and over-haste in belief. We suffer from a new kind of credulity. It was once complained that men are too easily inclined to believe what their fathers believed, that men lack originality and independence. But there is now reason to fear that men may too easily believe what no one has ever believed before. Men with settled convictions may become as rare as men with ancestry and traditions. And the consequences must be scarcely less detrimental to social welfare than the conse-

<sup>6</sup> H. Fielding, *Hearts of Men*, pp. 274-275.

quences of complacency and narrow-mindedness. For that inquisitiveness and fluidity of mind which is the condition of the discovery of new truth, is intolerable in society at large. Theory must correct and enlighten belief, but it cannot, consistently with the conduct of any considerable enterprise, replace belief.

I cannot hope to offer any general solution of what appears to be a recurrent and inevitable problem. It is of the very essence of life that it should be both conserved and changed. To belief society owes its cohesiveness and stability; to theory it owes its chance of betterment. And since every human motive is liable to exaggeration, society will always suffer harm on the one hand from complacency, and on the other hand from reckless innovation. Conflict between the mood of theory and the mood of belief, or between the party of theory and the party of belief, will doubtless remain to the end a source of confusion and waste. And this conflict will be most bitter where the most is at stake; respecting those ideas, namely, in which society is most deeply involved. But I think that we are justified in drawing certain inferences that are not wholly insignificant. In the first place, since there is a virtue in belief that has no equivalent in theory, it is wise to surrender belief reluctantly. A due recognition of the gravity of such a crisis permits no other course. Some degree of stolidity and inertia is a mark of moral poise. Nor is this incompatible with intellectual alertness and curiosity. It requires only that one shall acquire reserve, and refuse to admit strange theories at once to the circle of one's dear convictions. Similarly, conservatism in social action is not incompatible with the liveliest and most serious speculation concerning human institutions; but if this is to be possible, society must act more slowly than the curious-minded speculate, and insist that ideas be long tested, and gradually absorbed.

There is also a certain obligation in this matter that rests with theorists, and more especially with those who are devoted to the examination of the most fundamental ideas. It happens, doubtless because these ideas have not as yet permitted of exact treatment, that there is here the least barrier between theory and belief. Political, social, and philosophical theory speak the language of common sense, using terms that signify the objects of

daily life. It is as though the anthropologist were to allude to his personal friends. But there can never be any exact correspondence between the objects of theory and the objects of belief, because they are defined by different contexts, and belong to different systems. All the more reason, then, why different terms should be employed, and the layman be spared the needless fear that his bread or soul's salvation hangs on the fortunes of an argument.

What I have said applies with peculiar force to the philosopher. No one else debates such grave issues; nor is there any other region of theoretical inquiry in which differences and fluctuations of opinion are so marked. And I refer here not especially to those who proclaim themselves metaphysicians, but to all theoretically minded persons, including scientists and moralists, who busy themselves with ultimate questions. It would seem to follow that society is in special need of avoiding a hasty assimilation of such theory. And yet the terms which it employs are terms which symbolize to mankind their most trusted and cherished objects of belief. No one has taken the name of the Lord his God in vain so frequently and unconcernedly as the philosopher. While philosophers dispute, believers witness with dismay the apparent dissolution not only of God, but of immortality, freedom, marriage, and democracy as well. I wish that philosophy, for theoretical purposes, might speak a language of its own, and settle its disputes in a vernacular that does not arrest the attention of the community. If this were possible, philosophy would be better entitled to the full benefit of that immunity from direct social responsibility which is most conducive to clear seeing and straight thinking. And society could afford to wait for the application of a more refined and better-tested truth.

No theorist is under obligation immediately to give society the benefit of his theorizing. It was said of Samuel Clarke, who sought to overthrow atheism by scientific argument, that no one had really doubted the existence of God until he undertook to prove it. There will always be an absolute difference between rational assent on theoretical grounds, and implicit belief. The theoretical mood, even when a conclusion is reached, is a state of practical doubt. When the transition is made from believing

to theorizing, the loss is certain; and he who lightly encourages such a transition is guilty of recklessness and irresponsibility. It is a grave matter to substitute one's own theory, however well-reasoned, for another man's belief. For the belief is a part of the believer's life, a condition of the confidence and hopefulness of his action. It is a mistaken idea that honesty compels every theorist to be a propagandist; it is true, rather, that in the great majority of instances humanity, and a serious regard for the well-being of society, require that he shall not.

The task of mediating between theory and life is perhaps the most delicate and responsible task which it falls to the lot of any man to perform. And it cannot be denied that the theoretical habit of mind tends to disqualify one for undertaking it. For the investigator is trained to neglect every consideration but such present evidence as he can obtain. The human probability that his conclusions may some day, perhaps tomorrow, be over-ruled by new evidence, he properly excludes from his consideration. It is not relevant to his problem. But while theories may be changed with little cost and with certain gain, this is not true of beliefs. Here the cost is more certain than the gain. And the very consideration which the theorist is trained to neglect, and must neglect if his mind is to be free, is here of paramount importance. He who is to advise men must be the friend of men. He must understand their hopes and share their responsibilities. Hence he must regard every idea with reference to its effect on that present, concrete, human state of mind, from which all social action must proceed. No one has proclaimed more eloquently than Francis Bacon that it is to knowledge that man owes his triumph over nature and his advancement in all noble arts. But he would willingly, I think, have said of established belief, what he said of antiquity, that it "deserveth that reverence, that *men should make a stand thereupon* and discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is well taken, then to make progression."

*THE DEFINITION OF THE SUPERNATURAL*

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With the ultimate purpose of helping to clarify thought on the subject of the supernatural, the present essay is a study of usage mostly in Christian history and particularly of today. It therefore notes the meanings which seem to be assigned to the word and to its synonyms and associates; and it includes some criticism of usage, according to the accepted laws of thought, such as may contribute to the purpose of clarification.

The literature of the subject contains three chief meanings of the words "nature" and "supernatural," which may be indicated as follows.

Under the first of these views, the supernatural is God the Creator, together with his immediate acts and whatever else has immediate relations with him, such as heaven, his home. Hence nature includes "the whole of created things after they have left the hand of God," especially if connected with matter. In this classification, angels, demons, and discarnate human spirits are not always considered, but, if considered, they are usually classed as supernatural. The meaning thus varies from its smallest content, God alone, to its largest, all beings, superhuman or superearthly. This is the every-day usage among people of ordinary intelligence and generally among their superiors. For convenience these meanings of our two chief words may be designated as nature<sup>1</sup> and supernatural<sup>1</sup>.

Secondly, nature is so regarded as to include all being whatever. Such is the implication when we speak of the "nature of God," or say every being has a nature. So wrote Scotus Erigena, "Nature in its broadest sense includes all things created and uncreated"; and Nietzsche says, "Miracles belong to a higher order of things which is a nature also"; and, according to Ruskin, "A human act may be super-doggish, and a divine act super-human, yet both of them are absolutely natural"; and very

lately Professor W. A. Brown of Union Theological Seminary and Professor Stearns of Bangor write, "A miracle is the most natural of all events." Pantheists and other parties have favored this notion quite as much as those who hold chairs in orthodox seminaries. Schelling declared that "nature . . . the creation . . . is not the mere phenomenon and revelation of the Eternal, but is rather the very Eternal itself; and, as Spinoza says, the more we discover the individual things, the more we discover God." We may characterize the movement of thought on this line as an alternating current; the pantheists have reversed the thought and regarded everything as really supernatural, the so-called natural being only an illusion. When, however, the current is direct, it implies that there is no supernatural. With such a meaning Theodore Parker shocked many good people of Boston by saying, "God is the most natural being in the world," and "every [event] is natural because it is true, it is a fact." And many have said that miracles are natural to Christianity.

Thus, following the varying usages of words, one man may say that there is a supernatural, and another that there is no supernatural; and both are right—according to the meanings assigned to nature. This second usage we mark  $\text{nature}^2$  and  $\text{supernatural}^2$ ; but (except with pantheists)  $\text{supernatural}^2 = 0$ .

Thirdly, in a large number of expressions nature really means the region of necessity, and supernatural therefore the region of free wills both divine and human, though most writers omit the human. This meaning is perhaps more often found implied than fully intended and purposed; yet, on the whole, it is so often used as to require attention. Bushnell and others have seen in man's free will a creative power, and have therefore regarded human free will as supernatural. A. H. Strong<sup>1</sup> says, "Nature is the manifestation of God under the law of cause and effect. Mind is the manifestation of God under the law of freedom." Observe also that physics is committed to this distinction (except for theism) when it defines cause as the transfer of energy or of  $\frac{mv^2}{2}$ . For any event that happens outside the circle of mass and velocity may then be called supernatural. And, even so, Huxley

<sup>1</sup>Christ in Creation, pp. 55-56; compare Frazer, Philosophy of Theism, 1st Series, pp. 248-275.

and others have declared thought to be a miracle. Kant, Deussen, and Dorner<sup>2</sup> have called morality supernatural. Professor Hudson said, "It cannot be too often asserted that what we call the order of nature is not ethical at all: the laws of nature as such have nothing to do with morality." Matthew Arnold similarly wrote, "Man must begin, know this, where nature ends." J. S. Mill<sup>3</sup>, if I rightly understand, him recognized nature<sup>2</sup> and nature<sup>3</sup>, saying: "Nature has two chief meanings: it either denotes the entire system of things, with the aggregate of all their properties, or it denotes things as they would be apart from human intervention."

In the literature relating to miracles the word "law" is found to be used mostly in the several meanings following:—

1. Arbitrary appointments, human or divine: statute-law.
2. Moral law, not arbitrary, originating not in God's will but in his being or nature, of which his will is an expression.
3. The constituent principles of anything, as in the sentence, "God will act according to the laws of his being."
4. Great scientific generalizations, such as: "The law of gravity is that all matter attracts all other matter directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance."
5. Any commonly observed or supposed order in which things occur is called a law. This is the favorite meaning of the scientists, and is often declared to be the only proper meaning. "Physical laws are not compulsory, they rule nothing, they are but statements of our more or less uniform experience."
6. Necessary order: "A mathematical law is a law not only because it is always found to be true, but because its untruth would be impossible."
7. The total of all order, past, present, and to come, observed and unobserved.
8. A force or cause operating regularly. This is the meaning most commonly used, though it is often condemned by those who attempt to be accurate as a gross abuse and as a sign of an unscientific mind—if so, however, one might remark, nearly all the scientists are unscientific.

<sup>2</sup>System of Ethics, p. 59.

<sup>3</sup>Three Essays, p. 64.

Several other shades of meaning have been observed or must be inferred as a device for making a statement mean something; but the above seem to include all that we need to notice.

When a man so writes that several of these meanings may apply at the same time without confusion, he may perhaps be entitled to so many as his language may include and yet be true. There are, however, many unconscious attempts to combine several meanings which result in confusion more or less mischievous. Thus where we talk about "laws observed by the lower animals," the mental picture implied is of statute laws (law 1), whereas the objective fact is merely the way in which animals are seen to act (law 5). Similar confusions are in such expressions as: "the laws regulating the growth and decay of vegetation," and "the laws determining the movements of inanimate bodies or masses"—unless indeed those be regarded as instances of law 8.

More serious confusion arises when in the processes of reasoning, a premise is affirmed which is true in one meaning of law, and an inference is drawn which is legitimate only as from another meaning. Something like this seems to be in one of the common arguments for the existence of God. It is said that "if there are laws of nature, there must be a law-giver, that is God." This would be good reasoning if "law of nature" meant such a law as is found in Blackstone. It is true that statute-law is proof of the existence of a law-maker; but such is not the ordinary meaning of the law of nature. It is only in a metaphor that we say "the laws of God are written all over his works." If we speak literally and understand law in its most approved scientific sense (say law 5) the conclusion cannot be confidently drawn. The later teleology does not reason merely from an observed order that there is a personal author of the order. When, however, the order is moral, or seems to have been directed or interfered with in such a way as to benefit mankind, then we apprehend signs of intelligent handling or personal direction, and accordingly we infer a personal author.

In a few writers no distinction is observed among things supernatural; but generally, since the early centuries of Christianity, miracles have been distinguished from magic, in that the former

were done by God and his agents, and the latter by the devils. Loisy's distinction may, however, be preferred. He sees in miracles the socially approved, and in magic the socially disapproved. When therefore, we may infer, St. Hilarion gave a Christian jockey some holy water by means of which he won a horse-race, the question whether the result was a miracle or magic may be decided by vote.

Another distinction almost as ancient as the preceding, and not less important, recognizes the difference between subjective miracles and objective miracles. This distinction has not been uniformly observed; for many are found who speak or write as if the objective miracle were the only kind known to the church. Thus when the Protestants decided that miracles had ceased from the time when Christianity became the religion of the Roman Empire, or again that they ceased when the last apostle died, they meant the objective miracles only; for they have always held to subjective miracles, such as conversion and the ordinary operation of the Holy Spirit when he works within the soul. Nor did they mean all kinds of the objective; for example, prayers for rain and for victory in war are still offered up, and are supposed to be answered objectively.

The growth of intelligence has in three ways reduced the number and changed the quality of miracles believed in. First, mankind have assumed (whether rightly or wrongly, need not be discussed) that whatever is found to occur regularly, especially if it have a physical antecedent or means, is not a miracle. Familiarity is a great enemy of the miracle. We no longer ask, as St. Augustine asked significantly, "Who gave chaff such power to freeze that it preserves snow that has been buried under it, and such power to warm that it ripens green fruit?" "Who can explain the strange properties of fire which, though bright itself, blackens everything it burns?" and so on.

A second example is the decay of belief in the devil and his works, on account of which change we have mostly ceased to believe in magic and witchcraft, that most terrible part of the history of human cruelty. Today we have so far outgrown that kind of thing, that we read with suspicion that until about three hundred years ago all classes of people believed in witchcraft,

—popes, literary men, and reformers, ritualists and puritans, old world and new world; Thomas Aquinas, the greatest mind in the church, Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, Bossuet, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Beza, John Wesley, Cotton Mather, one of the presidents of Harvard College, Coke, Bacon, Shakspeare—though it is fair to say that some of these were far less credulous than others.

A third cause of the decline of the sense of the supernatural, or of the miracle-habit, is the discrediting of ancient humbugs, accompanied by the accrediting of only a smaller number of new ones. We make jest of Marco Polo's circumstantial account of a mountain in Asia which a Christian "having faith as a grain of mustard seed" had removed to another place by prayer, "by which miracle many Saracens became Christians." It may be well to recall that this miracle occurred before Marco Polo arrived at the place. Reports of eye-witnesses, however, are to be had of many miracles. Sir John Mandeville is apparently responsible for the statement that "iron will float in the Dead Sea and feathers will sink; which he would not have believed had he not seen it." And that witches changed themselves into cats is often affirmed. Lecky quotes a report that one man succeeded in cutting off the leg of a cat that attacked him, and that the leg immediately turned into that of an old woman, and four witnesses signed a certificate attesting the fact.

Miracles were in such a number that "a mere catalogue of those done by Thomas à Becket fills thirteen octavo pages." All this was not among Catholics only. The kings of England, whatever their relations to religion, were very potent against epilepsy and scrofula. Charles II had such virtue that he touched effectively nearly one hundred thousand people. This practice extended to the time of William III, who himself regarded the whole thing as a superstition, and on one occasion, consenting to lay his hand on a patient, said, "God give you better health and more sense." To which Whiston adds that "the patient was healed in spite of William's incredulity."

Those who speak of miracles, whether as friend or foe of the supernatural, commonly use the same defining and describing terms, and a great number of them.

1. The miracle is usually thought of as an act of God in violation of natural law, and as such it breaks, transgresses, opposes, contradicts, antagonizes, contravenes, interferes with, suspends, infringes upon, the law. Some thirty or forty synonymous words and phrases are in use for this idea.

But a moment's consideration might suffice to show that violation of the law cannot distinguish the miracle, for among the forces of nature not commonly called miraculous all the forms of opposition are to be found and are indeed common occurrences. All natural events are brought about by several forces interacting and more or less counteracting. Often with the greatest violence individuals and whole orders are regardlessly swept away. It is said that a hundred times as many species have existed on earth as are now alive. Their laws (senses 3, 5, 8) have been violated, destroyed, annihilated. Violence is itself a part of the great law (sense 5) of evolution. If now violence is in nature and law, it cannot define miracle while that is thought of as the opposite of law.

Some have thought to save the miracle and law and other associated sanctities by acknowledging that miracles are more or less opposed to law or nature and are to some extent within nature as known to us, but "they are examples of laws unknown to us"—Theodore Parker said "laws unknown and unknowable." This definition, at least in Parker's form, presents the difficulty of our knowing the existence of the unknowable. And apart from Parker the definition is merely a special form of the first definition. The same conclusion must be reached with regard to any synonym, such as "unique," or any other form of opposition or exception.

2. The miracle is also thought of as not opposed to law but independent of law, transcending law, outside law, the antithesis of law. The idea may apparently be reached in this way: human thoughts and feelings are real things which have nothing to do with the law of gravity; they do not attract each other like material things, nor do they change the law of attraction between material things. Now imagine some event which is as independent of all laws as thoughts are of gravity, and that is a miracle.

One might inquire how anything so thoroughly outside nature could be known to us, for in our experience things are known by the changes they make in what would otherwise be the order of nature (law 5). At any rate this definition does not help us much in our present study, for the miracles we are interested in, those of the Bible and the church especially, are not outside nature and its order but inside. After all, this idea might be regarded as a subordinate form of opposition. He that is not for us is against us.

3. Rejecting therefore these clews as the defining characteristics, let us inquire whether the idea of direct relation with God may not serve. Miracles are often so defined. But with this there are two difficulties. For when the saints and the ritual perform miracles as the agents of God (according to the Catholic church and some Protestants), God is acting indirectly, and, secondly, we meet the same difficulty as before, for in the usual Christian theory (except deism) God has also direct relations with every event and is one of the active causes in its occurrence.

Some minds are, however, satisfied with the last statement, and accordingly declare that all events are miraculous, as a part of the doctrine of the omnipresent activity of God; and they piously repeat, "It is a mark of wisdom to see the miraculous in all nature." Schleiermacher said, "Miracle is only the religious name for event."

4. Other writers are partly satisfied. They point out, for instance, that some events must be regarded as having in them large elements of human depravity and therefore small elements of the divine; while other events are quite the reverse and are mostly divine. The first must be regarded as for the most part in opposition to God, and the second as specially God's work, or as miraculous. Ritschl said, "A miracle is any striking natural occurrence with which the special help of God is connected."

5. Or shall miracle signify special quality rather than quantity of the divine? Some incline to say that every advance in righteousness is a miracle. Deussen says, "Deeds of morality, being against the world and its laws, contradicting them in every sense, are miracles in the truest and strictest sense."

The facts, however, do not allow us to suppose that God is inter-

ested in morals only, and that miracles are limited to morals, or have no quality except the moral.

6. Accordingly, Dorner inclines to define as miraculous every advance to a higher stage, whether it be of power or knowledge or wisdom or love. Thus, when in the course of evolution there comes into being a new distinction or variation, that advance, great or small, physical or moral, is a miracle. And when it has become established and has taken a regular place among secondary things, it is no longer called miraculous.

7. While, however, it seems rationally impossible to confine miracle to any one of these several ideas, there is nothing to prevent its containing them all in a measure, as in the usage of some authorities it does. Before following this clew there is one other method of classifying the definitions which should be considered. They may be classified without much straining of terms, in two varieties corresponding to the two essential meanings of supernatural, marked above as supernatural<sup>1</sup> and supernatural<sup>2</sup>.

I. Accordingly, the first variety of miracle may be called the *fiat miracle*. Its idea seems to have been originally borrowed from the tricks of the popular magician, who without the use of visible means pronounces some mystic formula, and instantly brings forth a marvellous result. So the people of early times thought of God as the chief magician, and so the type of his action has commonly been regarded as: "Let there be light, and there was light." This idea of the miracle has prevailed in all historic times, and still prevails with most Christians.

The fiat miracle corresponds with the usage marked nature<sup>1</sup> and supernatural<sup>1</sup>, and with the idea of violation of natural law, though the milder synonyms may be often used. Many both of friends and foes of the supernatural have assumed this to be the only kind of miracle, and have on the one hand defended it as if they were defending the life of the church and religion and the last stronghold of virtue and piety; or on the other have denounced it as having no rational meaning or support, or more mildly have declared that the church and religion have, or soon will have, nothing to do with miracles or the supernatural.

II. The remaining ideas of the nature of the miracle can perhaps be brought together under the title the *immanent miracle*.

This is especially congruous with the general theory of divine immanence in the world, as the fiat miracle is with that of the divine transcendence. It is also associated with nature<sup>3</sup> and supernatural<sup>3</sup>. And its type is the relation of our own human mind or thought among the forces of nature. Or, to be more precise in such a matter, just as our mind makes a difference in a few of the processes of matter, so the divine mind makes a difference with all processes of nature. We may therefore regard everything as a miracle, or for convenience we may call the ordinary activities of God natural, and only the extraordinary activities miraculous. In the words of Professor Bowne, "All events are more or less supernatural"; and according to A. H. Strong, "Law is God's habitual action and miracle is his unique action." This idea or theory correctly interprets the usage of history wherein the word "miracle" is (unconsciously) a relative term, like the word "hot." Everything has some heat, but only those are called hot which have an extraordinary quantity of it.

Now as to the advantages of the two theories.

I. The fiat miracle makes prominent the transcendence of God and the essential difference between God and nature. Moreover it is easily understood, being the long-established custom of speech, and popular theology being built on it. It is directly approved by the writers of the Bible, at least as commonly understood. It is also supported by many of the discoveries or theories of modern science. When, for instance, the physical scientist announces his "closed circle" of material forces, he implies (however unconsciously) that anything (like a thought or feeling of God or man) which comes in effectively from the outside, as it certainly does, must change and do violence to the order within; that is, it violates the law within the "circle." Or, more briefly, "discontinuity of mind and matter" provides for the violation of some of the laws of matter (law 5) whenever mind affects the processes of nature. Still again, the hypnotist and his kind issue orders to their patients, which are distinctly of the fiat variety, and which produce results quite as surprising as many of the miracle stories of Bible or church. A few theologians (if not many) are already claiming that hypnotism, mind-cure, and the like have so nearly duplicated all the Biblical miracles as to remove

whatever objection scientists may have had to them in our former state of ignorance as to the possibilities of psychic activities among the forces of nature.

II. The advantages of the immanent miracle theory are said to be that it is more congruous with theism (as distinct from deism), that it is the real theory of many who have advanced the former idea (miracle I); for they also have taught that God is immanent in all nature, omnipresent and always active. It presents the idea of God as friendly to nature rather than hostile to it. It was the favorite view in the early Christian church in the East. It is also Biblical, it is in 1 Corinthians, where Paul wrote an essay on inspiration (a form of the miraculous), teaching that all "gifts" are of God, and are in grades and degrees. And there is a specialty also. Is there not a specialty in Plato, as truly as in Isaiah? It is more consistent with the facts, with science and philosophy, than is the fiat miracle. For, recognizing that nature abounds in violence, it does not attempt to define miracle by the attribute of violence. Acknowledging that science has in general a right to be believed, it develops its theory in a form unobjectionable from the scientific standpoint. For, speaking both historically and logically, the objections to miracles are objections to the fiat miracle, and have little, if any, force against the immanent miracle. Indeed the latter theory seems able to save to our faith all the Biblical and other miracles that can be rationally saved.

The theory of immanent miracle is equally considerate of the powerful claims of pantheism among the great and pious of all ages. It takes its ontology and something more from pantheism, being careful however to retain personality of God as essential to Christianity.

But not only does this view of the miracle make peace with science and philosophy, it contains the promise and potency of peace among the "two and seventy warring sects" of Christianity, and even the other worthy religions. It is therefore the great missionary theory, for it alone recognizes the probability of miracles in other faiths and the inspiration of their founders and prophets. Evidence grows almost daily that only by this understanding of the subject can Christianity placate its rivals and thus enlist their best intelligence, appreciation, and affection.

Now neither the fiat theory nor the immanent theory is guaranteed by undisputed authority; and which one of them we should personally accept is mostly a matter of convenience, so long as we hold to the facts and to the laws of sound reasoning. But some may prefer (repeating definition 7 above) to generalize usage and to bring into one sentence the several ideas of miracle. We observe, then, that the word "miracle" is a relative term with a composite and variable meaning: it contains some idea of the supernatural (1 or 3), something of the thought of violating natural law (law 5, at any rate), something unique or exceptional, something of good morals or at least of advancing the divine order or purpose; and accordingly the miracle in general more nearly immediate than other events in relation to God; and these elements vary in different authors and different cases even to the extent that one may be at times unexpressed or only subconsciously intended.

The liberals and the scientists often repeat that "miracle in the sense of violation of law is simply impossible." True, when law means moral or necessary law, or all law whatsoever (law 2, 6, or 7), but not when it means law 5 or 8, which are its common meanings, scientific or popular.

It is frequently said among "advanced thinkers" that, in the phrase of one of them, "the occasional interference must go." But every stroke of lightning is an occasional interference, and every summer shower interferes with some farmer's haying, and Jesus himself was a specially great interference with the order of contemporary civilization and on an occasion which in a true sense had long been prepared for. Everything natural or supernatural interferes with something, and, if it be guided by reason, it does so on a proper occasion.

We still hear and read a well-worn protest: "God will not violate his own laws." Of course he will not violate moral and necessary laws (law 2 and 3) and some other laws, but he is violating law in its usual scientific meaning (law 5) perhaps all the time, and so are we men, if we have any initiative or originality.

How often and how confidently is it affirmed that "the church must give up miracles as it has given up witchcraft." Doubtless

it ought to give up certain extreme forms of the idea and certain partial and fragmentary conceptions, but the more moderate and large-minded ideas stand approved (if not quite proved) by science and philosophy as set forth by high authorities.

Quite as zealous are the defenders of the miracle from the charge of offending science and law. A celebrated author lately wrote: "The Creator may modify the course of events without infringing on any law. Man by new combinations of the forces of nature has changed the whole face of things, and surely the Creator must have the same power to an extent infinitely greater." Is it true that one may change the whole face of things, and infinitely more, without infringing on any law? Yet even this might be true if the meaning of law were limited to law 2, 4, 6—which it is not.

Another declares that "God reveals himself in the order of the world, and not by occasional interruptions or breaks in that order." Why not in both? Indeed there could not long remain any faith in God at all in human hearts, were not the established order occasionally changed, that some advance might be made. And among the changes observed are all sorts of violation, even to the extent of annihilation of some laws, as already said.

It is often asserted that "miracle is an event in nature without a material cause." No, every event in nature is brought about by the parallelogram of forces, and the spiritual agencies which have to do with any event may, so far as we now know, be counted in with the forces. At any rate, it does not appear that the spiritual dispenses with the natural in producing an event within nature.

A special dictum of one class of theologians is that "philosophic theism must regard divine power as the immediate source of all phenomena alike." This is true only if pantheism be true. The almost universal Christian view is that the divine power is no more than one of the immediate sources.

Every now and then a minister gets discouraged because the old ideas are being given up. A few years ago a clergyman resigned because, as he said, "there is no longer any final authority in the Scriptures as now understood, and therefore the church can no longer vouch for anything." This, he said, "destroys

the value of the church." But in these days of a larger and more accurate knowledge of the world, and of the compelling power of its rational understanding, Professor Shaler writes, "The admonitions of right-doing and the denunciations of evil conduct which come to us from the world of fact are as mandatory as any that come from the supernatural realm." And, besides, the miracle remains in some accepted definition and has in its own nature a proper relation to authority. "He that made me whole, the same said unto me, Take up thy bed and walk." Power is instinctively obeyed. Let Mrs. Eddy or Mr. Dowie be supposed to perform a miracle, and multitudes will slavishly follow them and obey their commands. Jesus found the instinct too strong at times, and was obliged to rebuke it, that men might honor gentleness and love instead. The authority of the miracle-worker may be trusted to human instinct.

A recent lecture announced: "In the future religion there will be no supernatural, . . . it must conform to natural law, . . . it must be completely natural." But grant all that the author said about the abuse of the supernatural in the past and among the ignorant of the present, there is still a supernatural, as indeed the author himself believes and teaches. Yet his quoted words are true in the meaning of supernatural<sup>2</sup> and in some extreme forms of supernatural<sup>1</sup>. Careful definition, however, being omitted in the lecture quoted, each hearer was liable to take the word in his own meaning, to the increase of confusion, and that, too, on an occasion which in greatness of opportunity for usefulness can seldom be duplicated.

Still more recently a great preacher feels that he has outgrown the need of miracles, and while therefore he has ordinarily kept silent on the subject, he now must speak out in the interests of clear thought and "for the instruction of the young." For this purpose he publishes an eloquent book which in effect conceals the variation of definitions, and everywhere implies that the only kind of miracle is the fiat miracle. Of course he is understood by nearly all parties to be attacking the miraculous and supernatural elements in general of Christianity, whereas he means only to discount a certain special view of the subject. Thus many are unnecessarily offended and estranged, and confusion still remains, for the young and old.

Would it not be well if theologians and others would cease trying to impose their particular definitions on the world, and to judge by them the times present and future, and would recognize instead the rights of other definitions? While therefore we hold individual opinions with all due strength, let us pray that we be able to know and to rejoice in the strength of our foes, and to give them all possible aid and comfort. Has not the time now fully come for an intelligent and sympathetic co-operation, whereby a more abundant life may be given both to special opinions and to the great interests of religion in general?

At any rate, the great and good men whose words are quoted in the few pages just preceding all believe in God, and therefore in the supernatural (in the common sense of the word), and none of them intend to say that religion present or future can get along without the supernatural, in that sense. They also believe that God is at work in the world, changing its order for the better, gently if he can and violently if he must. That is to say, they believe in miracles, in accepted meanings of the word; and they never meant to deny these things, but to affirm that the supernatural and the miracle are essential to Christianity, are its very life and support, and will always be so.

On the whole, then, we may conclude that neither the words of the conservatives nor those of the liberals furnish occasion for wrath or for alarm; and that a study of usage in general contributes not only to clear ideas, but also to peace, even the peace of faith.

*JESUS AS SON OF MAN*

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In a discussion of the great christological passages of the Synoptic Gospels we have seen that the messianism of Jesus was pre-eminently ethical and religious. His attitude toward current expectations of Israel's redemption resembled that of the prophets in being critical rather than originative. He ethicized and spiritualized a hope which in its origins and in its undisciplined popular manifestations had little to differentiate it from the expectations entertained by heathen worshippers of their tribal or national divinities.

As regards the political hopes of the Zealot, or nationalist, party this is universally recognized. Jesus' prohibition of the application of the title Christ to himself (Mk. 8 30)<sup>1</sup> is commonly explained as due to his unwillingness to be understood to claim messiahship in the political sense.

As regards the Pharisaic, or pietistic, type of messianism, then largely affected by the apocalyptists, many influential critics are endeavoring to convince the modern world that Jesus' attitude was more sympathetic than critical. The apocalyptists since Daniel had given a transcendental turn to the ancient belief, and the Pharisees, once characterized by a more ethical and inward type of pietism, were now degenerating into a more formal legalism, while they enforced the burden of Mosaic requirements imposed by the scribes under penalty of exclusion from a share in the supermundane "world to come." This doctrine of a transcendental messianic "world to come" was an acknowledged innovation borrowed from apocalypse. The contention of J. Weiss and his school is that Jesus was fundamentally an *Apo-*

<sup>1</sup> Parallels are not cited where there is no evidence of independent tradition. In the reference Mk. 8 30 the earliest of the three embodiments of the tradition is appealed to. The fact that it is transcribed with slight modifications in Mt. 16 20 and Lk. 9 21 adds nothing to the force of Mark's evidence.

*kalyptiker*, in full sympathy with this tendency, especially as represented in John the Baptist, the popularizer of the movement.

Our own attempt has been to show that Jesus' preaching of "the kingdom" involves no less truly a critical attitude toward the transcendental other-worldliness of the Pharisees than toward the worldliness of Sadducee or Zealot. We hold that with all his sympathy for the Baptist's revolt against hierocracy, with all his endorsement of the Baptist's warnings of the impending judgment, Jesus explicitly differentiated his message from that of John also, emphasizing his own milder, more mystical type of messianism. The germs of this may in fact be found in the older literature of Pharisaism, and in the kindred writings of the school of "wisdom."

Jesus' teaching, accordingly, regarding human destiny, as reflected in the messianic hope, goes deeper down and further back than Pharisaism. It is not identified with sect or party. It takes hold upon the ancient hope of Israel before it had suffered its special applications first to the institution of the Davidic monarchy, then to the post-exilic substitution of supermundane for nationalistic hopes. Jesus returns to the elementary principle of messianism, the old popular belief that Israel is (potentially) God's son. He agrees with the Pharisees that this ideal is to be realized by the son's "knowing" and "doing the will" of the Father. The difference lies partly in his conception of that "will"; for to the scribe and to his blind follower the Pharisee the will of God is a written precept to be obeyed; while to Jesus it is an inward disposition to be acquired. In this respect he approaches the wisdom-writers. The difference lies also in the result aimed at, which to the scribe and Pharisee is a reward added to the sonship, to Jesus the sonship itself with whatever of blessing that may entail (Q; Mt. 5 45, Lk. 6 35). In this respect he is more in antagonism than in sympathy with the apocalyptists, and again resembles those of the school of "wisdom," though himself not a man of the schools, but of the people.

If this interpretation of the messianism of Jesus be correct, it remains for us to explain how believers in his messiahship

should have given it the intensely transcendental and apocalyptic interpretation reflected in the earliest evangelic tradition. Both Paul and the Synoptists are saturated with the type of eschatology characteristic of the Synagogue. In both cases the messianic hope is pre-eminently transcendental. How can this be, if Jesus himself had not so taught? The answer in general terms will be that the belief in Jesus' messiahship did not spring from the utterances of his life-time, so much as from the ecstatic experiences of his followers after his death, and that these were conditioned upon the disciples' predetermined forms of thought. At first it was not even pretended that Jesus had made his own person and work the subject of his teaching. This we find only in the late theological gospel emanating from Ephesus, the headquarters of Paulinism. In all the earlier writings, whether historical or epistolary in form, the doctrine of Christ's person and work is avowedly based, not on his remembered teaching, but on psychological phenomena in the experience of Paul and others, principally after Jesus' death. And Paul was an out-and-out Pharisean apocalypticist.<sup>2</sup>

It is a highly significant fact that while our two ultimate witnesses, Paul and the evangelic tradition, are at one (as they could not fail to be) in their fundamental conviction that Jesus had been "manifested as the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead" (Rom. 1 4), or, in Petrine phrase, had been "made" by it "both Lord and Christ" (Acts 2 36), they differ widely in the titles by which they express their conception of his being and office. The title "Lord" is that which in Paul's use expresses the nature and function of the Christ. It is not peculiar to him, for we have just seen it employed in a typical Petrine passage. Neither is it of Pauline coinage; for we find Paul quoting even an Aramaic ejaculation of which it forms part (Maran atha, "Our Lord, come"), and the phrase "Jesus is Lord" is repeatedly referred to as expressing the consensus of

<sup>2</sup> The transfiguration story is expressly designed to carry back the Pauline transcendental conception of the messiahship into the earthly career of Jesus. But even in the Synoptic tradition it intervenes as a psychological anachronism, a rebuke of the twelve, which as yet they are incapable of understanding, for conceiving the messiahship of Jesus "after the things that be of men." In the Apocalypse of Peter it is frankly placed after the resurrection.

apostolic faith. Only indirectly and incidentally have we evidence even of Paul's acquaintance with the distinctively apocalyptic title Son of Man. His quotation from Psalm 8 in 1 Cor. 15 27, and his doctrine of "the heavenly man," make us suspect indeed that in his thinking he applied to Christ, in his own distinctive way, this apocalyptic title. But from his writings otherwise we should not so much as guess that the title had ever been applied to Jesus.

The evangelic tradition, on the other hand, displays it in a manner entirely peculiar to itself. The title "Son of Man" occurs in no New Testament writing, outside of those of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John; and these are notoriously interdependent. If, as many maintain, its frequent occurrence in the gospels can be accounted for on no other theory than the usage of Jesus himself, our view of his eschatological teaching will require adjustment to the fact. But we shall also be required to account for its non-appearance outside the four interdependent evangelic writers. If, on the other hand, we advance some other theory to account for its occurrence here, our burden of proof will not be light. We shall not be suffered to reject the combined testimony of the four evangelists that Jesus applied the title to himself, unless we deal comprehensively with this question of the literary interdependence of the sources; for no careful student will admit that the common participation in this feature can be due to accidental coincidence. Let us face the situation. The peculiar term can only have pervaded the four gospels by transmission from some very early common source. Such a primitive common source, capable of affecting all by its use of the title Son of Man as a self-designation of Jesus, is the document Q, only the Gospel of Mark lying, as some hold, outside the range of its influence. No other source definitely known to us ever occupied a place primitive and authoritative enough to produce this result. If, then, this application of the title be a contamination of the primitive tradition rather than a true record of Jesus' usage and consciousness, the evidence for such a conclusion must be sought in the document Q.

This document has been restored more carefully by Harnack than by any predecessor in the field, from the coincident non-

markan material of Matthew and Luke. Harnack singles out the Thanksgiving to the Father (Mt. 11 25-27, Lk. 10 21-22) and the discourse on the Jews' Stumbling in Jesus (Mt. 11 2-11, 12-13, 16-19, Lk. 7 18-23, 31-35, 16 16) as the most important in all Q for their christological content.<sup>3</sup> Having already discussed the significance of the former of these passages, we may now take the latter as our starting-point for a consideration of the question of the real origin and significance of the title Son of Man.

In Harnack's restoration the passage reads as follows: "For John came neither eating nor drinking, and they say, He hath a devil. The Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they say, So, a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners. But Wisdom hath been justified by her children."

Harnack concludes his discussion of the christology of Q with a remark both just and significant: "Even with the most conservative application of psychological considerations it is apparent that Jesus' consciousness of sonship must have antedated his consciousness of messiahship, and paved the way for it." We take this to mean that of the two supposedly fundamental passages of Q<sup>4</sup> Harnack himself recognizes the one distinguished by the use of the title "the Son" as more characteristic than that which employs the title the "Son of Man." Jesus unquestionably had the consciousness of sonship. He probably found in it the solution of the messianic hope cherished by the people. Did he infer from the present leadership imposed by circumstance upon the possessor of this consciousness such continued leadership in "the world to come" as current eschatology expected of the apocalyptic figure of the Son of Man? What ground have we for accepting the authenticity of the second title?

It is scarcely conceivable that in so old a source as Q the title Son of Man should be repeatedly placed in Jesus' mouth if it did not really belong in some way to his vocabulary. But this admission, while abandoning the philological line of argument of the Aramaists who maintain that in Aramaic the expression "the

<sup>3</sup> Sprüche und Reden Jesu, p. 166.

<sup>4</sup> In Harnack's Sprüche und Reden Jesu they are numbered 25 (Mt. 11 23-27, Lk. 10 21 f.) and 15 (Mt. 11 16-19, Lk. 7 31-35) respectively.

Son of Man," would be impossible, is by no means equivalent to an admission that Jesus applied the title to himself. For, first, it is not only probable but demonstrable that even our most ancient records, including Q itself, insert the title in many cases without authority, and, secondly, among the admittedly authentic instances of Jesus' own use of the term, there are several where the meaning is more characteristic of him if Son of Man is understood as applying to some other than his own glorified personality. We may take up these two propositions in order.

1. It is certainly remarkable that Harnack, in a footnote on the very same page on which occurs his classification of the discourse on the Stumbling of the Jews (Nos. 14, 15) with Jesus' Thanksgiving for his Revelation (No. 25) as the two most important christological passages of Q, expresses the following opinion on the occurrence of the title Son of Man in the former:

Of course in individual cases one is utterly without positive assurance that Jesus referred to himself as "the Son of Man" in sayings wherein Q represents him as so designating himself. It is more than doubtful, for example, that Jesus should have used the expression in No. 15;<sup>5</sup> while earlier in the same discourse (No. 14, "Blessed is he that shall not be stumbled in me," etc.), he has quite manifestly avoided every messianic self-designation.

In other words, Harnack himself concedes the probable unauthenticity of the term in the passage which he advances as the most important! For we can only escape the linguistic argument of Lietzmann, Wellhausen, and N. Schmidt, that as a title "Son of Man" would be meaningless in the Aramaic spoken by Jesus, if we suppose that the etymologically colorless expression, equivalent to "human being," *homo*, *Mensch*, had acquired a more specific connotation through its application in Daniel and later apocalypses. Its employment, then, by Jesus would be either enigmatic, or distinctly messianic in the transcendental sense. Either employment would call public attention to his personality in a manner admittedly contrary to the policy of silence observed by himself and imposed upon his disciples (Mk. 8 30). Even those, accordingly, who maintain that this was Jesus' "favorite

<sup>5</sup> The passage whose comparison of the coming of the Baptist with that of "the Son of Man" was quoted above.

self-designation" are cautious about admitting his employment of it otherwise than in the privacy of the apostolic circle, and subsequently to the revelation of the messiahship at Caesarea Philippi. The passage from Q regarded by Harnack as the most important manifestly meets neither of these conditions. Here, therefore, the occurrence of the title is certainly to be attributed to the redactor of Q. To him the appearance of Jesus in his work of preaching and healing in Galilee, contrasting as it did with the Baptist's warning of judgment, was the coming of the Son of Man. Jesus himself, if he really looked upon his work as fulfilling the expected coming of the Son of Man,<sup>6</sup> could not have thus publicly declared it and at the same time retained the incognito which he imposed upon his disciples.

Since we are dealing with Harnack's discussion of the christology of Q, and since we are clearly within the range of his own conclusions when we infer from the passage under consideration that Q<sup>r</sup> manifests a disposition to insert the title Son of Man without historical warrant, we may properly call attention here to a further significant observation of the same distinguished critic:

Christology as Q understood it gives a perfectly consistent and simple portrait. Q has no other conception than this: Jesus was the Messiah, ordained to divine sonship at his baptism, and all his sayings accordingly rest upon this background. If, however, the introductory narrative be removed in thought, an essentially different conception results (p. 169).

This comes very near to an admission of the contention of Wernle in the most thorough study applied to the question until Harnack's, that we must distinguish a Q<sup>1</sup> and a Q<sup>2</sup>, attributing to the later hand (Q<sup>2</sup>) the introductory narratives relating to John the Baptist, together with some other elements.<sup>7</sup> Manifestly, the two sections on Jesus' baptism by John, and on the stumbling of the Jews at John and Jesus, have in common not merely the trait of the Baptist's work, but the common purpose, not apparent in Q as a whole, of setting the personality of Jesus on the highest

<sup>6</sup> On Jesus' idea of the Coming of the Son of Man, see below.

<sup>7</sup> Wernle, *Synoptische Frage*, p. 226: "Diese zwei Stücke [the Baptist's discourse and the Temptation of Jesus] sehen überhaupt aus wie eine geschichtliche Einleitung, die nachträglich dem Werk vorgesetzt wurde."

plane. Here, if anywhere in Q, we must suspect secondary elements.

Besides the discount to be made on the score of this admitted *Tendenz* of Q<sup>2</sup> or Q<sup>f</sup>, we must also ask consideration for the effect of a more general disposition of the times illustrated not only in Q, but from the Pauline epistles down to the period of the Oxyrhynchus Logia, namely, the disposition to attribute to Jesus "faithful sayings" or other current saws and apothegms having more or less affinity with his teaching, in particular "wisdom-sayings," such as that of Lk. 13 34-35, which in Mt. 23 37-39 is attributed directly to Jesus, with suppression of the actual derivation from "the Wisdom of God." The Oxyrhynchus logion "I stood in the midst of the world, and in the flesh was I seen of them," etc., is another plaint of the divine Wisdom, kindred to Baruch 3 37, similarly put in the mouth of Jesus. There is strong textual reason for so regarding Mk. 2 27 also, which appears neither in the parallels nor in the text, but is found as a rabbinic saying in *Joma* (fol. 85). To this category of aphorisms included among the sayings of Jesus from very early times because of resemblances of phraseology or content must, in our judgment, be reckoned at least one whose strongest title to the place it occupies is its employment of the expression "the Son of Man." It is the saying of Q: "The foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head" (Mt. 8 19-20, Lk. 9 57-58). The very mode of its employment here (in antithesis to the birds and beasts) is so different from any other of the employments attributed to Jesus, and the plaintive tone of self-pity so opposite to the grateful assurance of his hospitable reception in Mk. 10 29 f. (cf. Lk. 8 3, 10 38-42, 22 35), that we cannot regard the saying as authentic.<sup>8</sup> It seems to be a current aphorism contrasting the helplessness of the individual human being, a waif and stray when left alone in the environment of nature, with the self-sufficiency of birds and beasts. Only by a play upon the expression "Son of Man" can it be applied to Jesus at all. Even were its authenticity admitted, there is the same reason in this case as in that of the saying contrasting

<sup>8</sup> Against Harnack, who exclaims, apropos of the same, "Welch' ein Zeichen der Echtheit!" (p. 165).

Jesus' mode of life with the Baptist's for questioning its use of the title Son of Man under the circumstances described. It seems far more probable that this pendant to the warning against superficial discipleship (Mt. 8 21 f., Lk. 9 59 f.) has been taken up merely because of a misunderstanding of its untechnical use of the term "the son of man."

A third instance of Jesus' employment of the title Son of Man, adduced by Harnack in his reconstruction of *Q*, we are also compelled to reject as unauthentic, though it may possibly have stood in the source. Jesus is reported to have presented "the Son of Man" as "a sign to this generation in explanation of his offer of 'the sign of Jonah.'" Since it occurs in the same discourse as the instance first adduced, which Harnack himself considers doubtful on the ground that Jesus manifestly avoids making a public claim to messianic authority, it is difficult to see the consistency of maintaining the authenticity of this. However, we need not insist on this point, for it is easy to show independently that the explanation offered of "the sign of Jonah" is secondary and unauthentic.

We have at least four variant accounts of Jesus' answer to the demand for a sign from heaven. The oldest of our existing sources presents the enigma without any attempt at solution. Mk. 8 11, 12 (Mt. 16 1-4) treats it as simply a refusal to the unworthy people of their demand for an evidential miracle. Jesus "sighed deeply in his spirit and saith, Why doth this generation seek after a sign? Verily I say unto you, There shall no sign be given unto this generation." The addition, "no sign but the sign of Jonah," made in Matthew's transcript of this verse, is of course due to the influence, direct or indirect, of *Q*. Both forms of the Markan version agree, however, in representing that Jesus did not make a merely apparent refusal of the demand (which after all was ultimately to be granted), but made absolute the refusal of miraculous confirmation of his message. Both our first and our third Gospels, contrariwise, introduce explanations of the enigma calculated to mitigate the inconsistency of the refusal with their own disposition to find the chief evidences for their claims precisely in the miraculous element of Jesus' career, in particular the resurrection. The explanations given, however,

are inconsistent the one with the other. Critics are agreed that Matthew's interpretation of the sign of Jonah as the resurrection is too flagrantly contradictory of the context to be authentic. They are very generally disposed, however, to accept the explanation of Luke that the sign of Jonah is the person of Jesus.<sup>9</sup> In reality we have only to place the two side by side in the identical context to see that both are guesses, Luke's only less inconsistent than Matthew's with the general bearing of Jesus' discourse. We give the context in a translation of Harnack's text of Q.

But he said, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign, and no sign shall be given it save the sign of Jonah.

For like as Jonah was in the sea-monster's belly three days and three nights, so shall the Son of Man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights.

For like as Jonah was himself a sign to the men of Nineveh, so shall the Son of Man be to this generation.

The men of Nineveh shall arise in the judgment with this generation and shall condemn it, because they repented at the preaching of Jonah, and lo, a greater matter than Jonah is here.

A glance at Mt. 21 23-32, which, if not also embodying material from Q, is at all events in substance a parallel to the story of the Galilean demand for a sign from heaven, will show that in Jesus' conception the great sign of the times was the repentance of the masses at "the baptism of John." It was to him a fulfilment of the promise (Mal. 4 6) of the great repentance to be wrought by Elias before the Day of Yahweh. In remaining callous to this movement of the publicans and sinners the scribes and Pharisees had rejected their sign "from heaven." Thus the two examples of the Ninevites and the Queen of the South condemn "this generation" for its rejection of the "wailing" of John and the "piping" of Jesus. It is compared to "children in the market-place" because it yields neither to threat nor to entreaty. Whether, then, we have in Mt. 11 and Mt. 21 duplicate traditions of the same incident, or parallel utterances of

<sup>9</sup> Jn. 6 30 ff. combines these two.

Jesus on similar occasions, in either case they determine for us the sense of the answer unfavorably comparing the men of this generation to the men of Nineveh. It is only in the second member of the poetic comparison, that which compares them unfavorably to "the Queen of the South," that Jesus refers to his own preaching as "a greater matter" than the wisdom of Solomon.<sup>10</sup> In the first member he refers to the preaching of *John the Baptist*. Both the interjected explanations of the sign of Jonah, therefore, Luke's as well as Matthew's, are incorrect; and, if incorrect, then certainly unauthentic. Jesus referred by this expression<sup>11</sup> neither to his own personality nor to his resurrection, but to "the baptism of John."

2. Dismissing those instances whose real bearing attests not an authentic use by Jesus of the title Son of Man in application to himself, but on the contrary a disposition on the part of transmitters of the tradition to multiply unauthentic instances, we come to a relatively small residuum whose first value is to explain the *Tendenz* observed. Jesus really did employ the phrase; otherwise the *Tendenz* would be inexplicable. But did he employ it in application to himself? A satisfying answer calls for consideration of every authentic instance without exception, first of all the undisputed occurrences in Q. They are as follows:

(1) Mt. 12 32, Lk. 12 10.<sup>12</sup>

(2) Mt. 24 27, 37, 39, Lk. 17 24, 26, 30.

The former passage is one of the principal bones of contention between Wellhausen and the critics who continue to maintain the priority of Q to Mark. In Wellhausen's view, comparison of the variants in Mt. 12 31, 12 32, derived respectively

<sup>10</sup> Note the similar antithesis in Lk. 12 13-34, where Solomon appears as the rich and wise king of Ecclesiastes in contrast with the poverty of Jesus and his followers.

<sup>11</sup> Assonance between the names John and Jonah may have played a part.

<sup>12</sup> It is not apparent from Harnack's language in note 2 on p. 165 whether he regards this occurrence as "unsicher," as well as that in Lk. 12 8, where the parallel Mt. 10 32 has simply "I," or whether he holds to Mt. 12 32, Lk. 12 10 as certainly authentic. The former is designated by him No. 34<sup>a</sup> the latter No. 34<sup>b</sup>. His statement on p. 165 is: "Doch ist er [der Ausdruck Menschensohn] in Nr. 34<sup>a</sup> unsicher."

from Mk. 3 28 and Q (cf. Lk. 12 10), shows the priority of Mark to Q. He says:

In Mk. 3 28 we have: All blasphemies are forgiven *the sons of men*, except blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. In Q (Lk. 12 10) on the contrary: Utterances against *the Son of Man* are forgiven, only those against the Holy Spirit are not.

Were Wellhausen right, Q would be convicted in one more instance of introducing the title Son of Man with no better authority than a perversion of Mk. 3 28, thus increasing the probability that it is from later modification that the peculiar usage has pervaded gospel tradition.

But on this question we are constrained to take the view of Wellhausen's opponents. "Son of Man" is the original, "sons of men" the derived form. This is not a mere inference from the conclusion forced upon us by the evidences of Q's priority in all other instances of relation to Mark, it is apparent from the context of this particular discourse. According to all three reporters the utterance in question should explain the peculiarly heinous nature of the offence just committed (the declaration, "He casteth out by Beelzebub") which excepts it from even the divine pardon. According to Q (Mt. 12 32, Lk. 12 10) this is because, while seemingly directed only against Jesus, it had really assailed the Spirit of God. Because it is not Jesus personally who effects the healings and exorcisms, but "the Spirit of God," the offence is unpardonable. This is precisely the distinction which Mark, in accordance with the whole spirit of his gospel as shown in repeated instances, refuses to admit. The difference pointed to by Jesus between his exorcisms, performed "by the Spirit (Lk. finger) of God," without any assumption of special power or gift resident in himself, and the exorcisms of "your sons" (Mt. 12 27 f., Lk. 11 19 f.),—a vital element of the whole argument,—is omitted by Mark. The result—the intended result, so far as we can judge—is to make it appear that blasphemy of Jesus, by calumny of his works of power, is identical with blasphemy of the Holy Spirit, and hence unpardonable. In Q the offence is unpardonable because it is not against Jesus, but against the Holy Spirit. In Mark the offence is unpardonable because it *is*

against Jesus, and this is equivalent to an offence against the Holy Spirit. It is scarcely needful to indicate which of these two constructions of Jesus' utterance bears the stamp of originality and authenticity.

But the later Markan construction would have encountered an insuperable obstacle if the language of Q, "Whosoever blasphemeth the Son of Man it shall be forgiven him," had been left unchanged. The alteration in Mk. 3 28 to "All blasphemies shall be forgiven to *the sons of men*" is indispensable to Mark's conception, and hence was probably made for this reason.

Have we, then, by establishing in this instance the originality in Q of the title Son of Man, established its authenticity as a title applied by Jesus to himself? On the contrary, the whole force of Jesus' argument depends upon the distinction between his own personality as on a level with other men's, and the superhuman dignity of "the Spirit of God." In other words, the term Son of Man is used here not in the transcendental sense of apocalypse, but in the ordinary Old Testament sense of an every-day mortal as contrasted with God. The article, if the article was used in Jesus' utterance, would have to be understood as generic,—in German, *die Lästerung gegen den Menschen wird vergeben*, which in English must be rendered: "Blasphemy against a man can be forgiven." This, by all the evidence of context, is the real meaning of Jesus' saying. If there is application of a special title to Jesus himself in the passage of Q, it is not meant by Jesus, but is the importation of the compiler himself.

(3) The only other occurrences of the title Son of Man in Q stand in a single context, and unquestionably refer to the apocalyptic figure of the transcendental, Danielic, Deliverer. We give the passage in Harnack's reconstruction (No. 56):

If, then, they shall say unto you, Behold, he is in the wilderness, go not forth; behold, he is in his chambers, believe it not. For as the lightning goeth forth from the east and shineth unto the west, so shall be the Coming of the Son of Man; wheresoever the carcase is, there will the vultures be gathered.

As were the days of Noah, so shall be the Coming of the Son of Man. For as men were in the days before the cataclysm, eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, until the day that Noah entered into

the ark, and knew not until the cataclysm came and swept them all away, so shall be the Coming of the Son of Man.

There will be two in the field; one shall be taken and one left. Two women shall be grinding at the mill; one shall be taken and one left.

If there is any real ground in Q for regarding the title Son of Man as a "self-designation of Jesus," it must be found in these three connected occurrences of the phrase "the Coming of the Son of Man." Did Jesus mean by it his own return in glory; or did he refer to the Executioner of the divine judgment of whom John the Baptist had sounded the warning?

The general bearing of the teaching here in question is the same as of the apocalyptic chapter of Mark, into which parallel utterances have been taken up. Jesus deprecates resort to the casters of horoscopes and calculators of the end of the world and of the coming judgment. Vain and futile are their predictions. The coming of the Son of Man is a great divine event, comparable only to the mighty judgments visited on the earth in the days of Noah, or on the cities of the Plain in the days of Lot. What Old Testament writers refer to as the Day of Yahweh is now spoken of as the day of the coming of the Son of Man. We must certainly allow for the effecting in popular usage of an equivalence between the transcendental figure of Daniel (with the more recent apocalypses dependent on it) and the Coming One of John the Baptist. But there is no indication whatever that the equivalence, "Jesus is the Son of Man," had entered the mind of the speaker in the above discourse, or indeed any mind previous to that of the compiler of the Sayings. Until it can be shown (1) that Jesus regarded himself as the Messiah; (2) that he also considered this office to involve his return as executioner of the divine judgment in the coming of the Son of Man, the passage—the only one in which we have reason to think Jesus employed the title as applying to a transcendental figure—remains utterly without force to prove the contention in support of which it is adduced. The real evidence that Jesus entertained the fantastic dreams of apocalypse as applying to his own personality in a resurrected state thus reduces itself to nothing. There is evidence in plenty that the compiler of Q in the form employed by our evangelists had adopted the equivalence, "Jesus

s the Son of Man," and made no scruple of occasionally substituting the title for the personal pronoun where it seemed to him appropriate. There is here a possible explanation of the practice which has spread to all the gospels. There is no adequate evidence that Jesus ever applied the title to himself.

We have two possible criteria to determine whether this possible explanation of the spread of the usage is also the true one. (1) Mark, if at all dependent on Q, is admittedly so in a different sense and to a less degree than Matthew or Luke. We should expect, then, to find the title Son of Man less at home (so to speak) in Mark than in Q. (2) In Acts, especially in the speeches of Peter, we have by common consent a very early type of christology, if indeed we have not traces of a type of evangelic tradition wholly unaffected by Q. Let us briefly consider these two criteria.

(1) The facts regarding the Markan employment of the title are briefly summarized on p. xxxviii of the introduction to my commentary entitled *Beginnings of Gospel Story*, as follows: "The title Son of Man does not appear to characterize the fundamental elements of Mark (P). It occurs in editorial supplements derived from Q, and even then in an adapted sense." Space limitations of course preclude the citation here of the evidence on which this statement is made, but a reference to the individual instances as discussed in the volume quoted will suffice. The title does not appear from these to be indigenous to Mark, but an exotic. It occurs only in passages where there is independent evidence of the influence of Q.

(2) There is *no* occurrence of the title Son of Man throughout the Petrine speeches of Acts, though these are so largely concerned with the doctrine of Christ's humiliation and exaltation. As is well known, its only occurrence in the New Testament outside the four gospels is in the Speech of Stephen, Acts 7 56, recognized by Harnack and many others as derived from a different source. Even here it is not the words of the speech itself, but of its reporter, which suggest the equivalence, "The Son of Man is Jesus." On the theory that this was "the favorite self-designation of Jesus" the striking fact of its complete absence from the speeches of Peter in Acts remains as inexplicable as the equally unbroken silence of Paul.

We have reached the conclusion of our examination of the data. A just valuation of all the documentary evidence will at least compel us to admit a large discount from its *prima facie* impression. The alleged consensus of witnesses may easily reduce itself to the testimony of one, and the evidence of this one, the compiler of Q, is not altogether consistent with his own material or with the indirect evidence of others. Against it stands the incongruity of the conception with other teachings of Jesus, and the ease with which the enthusiastic apocalypticism of the early church might pass from certain sayings about the "Coming of the Son of Man" to the equivalence, "Jesus himself is the coming Son of Man." The preponderance of evidence would seem to incline toward an origin for this equivalence not in the sane and sober mind of Jesus, but in the exalted and visionary expectations of a church on fire with momentary expectations of the end.

*SACERDOTALISM*<sup>1</sup>

GEORGE E. HERR

NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION

The provisions for the fourth of the series of Dudleian Lectures are as follows:

"The fourth and last lecture I would have for the maintaining, explaining, and proving the validity of the ordination of ministers or pastors of the churches, and so their administration of the sacraments or ordinances of religion as the same hath been practiced in New England, from the first beginning of it, and so continued at this day. Not that I would in any wise invalidate Episcopal Ordination, as it is commonly called and practiced in the Church of England; but I do esteem the method of ordination as practiced in Scotland, at Geneva, and among the dissenters in England, and in the churches in this country, to be very safe, Scriptural and valid; and that the great Head of the church, by his blessed spirit, hath owned, sanctified, and blessed them accordingly, and will continue to do so to the end of the World. Amen."

The topic of Sacerdotalism is naturally involved in the terms of this Foundation.

The term "Sacerdotalism" has been defined as "the doctrine that the man who ministers in sacred things, the institution through which and the office or order in which he ministers, the acts he performs, the sacraments and rites he celebrates, are so ordained and constituted of God as to be the peculiar channels of His grace, essential to true worship, necessary to the being of religion, and the full realization of the religious life."<sup>2</sup>

The sacerdotal system is not necessarily connected with an episcopal system, though as an historical fact it has usually been identified with some theory of the rights and powers of bishops. In its widest significance Sacerdotalism is not necessarily con-

<sup>1</sup> Dudleian Lecture, delivered at Harvard University, May 4, 1910.

<sup>2</sup> A. M. Fairbairn, *Studies in Religion and Theology*, p. 19.

nected, as the etymology of the term indicates, with the priesthood, for the distinctive note of Sacerdotalism is exclusiveness. It signifies that a given order of men, or a given institution, is a peculiar channel of divine grace, in such a sense that true worship and the full significance of the religious life is only possible through it. Any denomination of Christians which holds that its church order, its officials, or its rites are essential to the bestowment of the grace of God, identifies itself with a phase of Sacramentalism. Presbyterianism, Independency, or Quakerism, by a note of exclusiveness, may easily become, in a legitimate, if not in the etymological sense, sacerdotal.

But historically Sacerdotalism, for the most part, has been true to the derivation of the word. It connects itself with a polity and a priesthood, an order of men, who stand in such a relation to Deity that they and they alone become the media of his grace. In Judaism this order was hereditary. In the Roman communion this order reaches back by tactual succession and consecration to the apostles. Grace flows downward from Christ himself and his apostles through a line of bishops every one of whom has received consecration from a predecessor until there is an unbroken line back to Christ himself.

The sharp antithesis to this position is taken by those communions which hold to the true priesthood of all believers. According to their view no intermediary between the soul and Christ is necessary. Any human soul may come directly to him in repentance and faith and receive the full measure of his grace.

The leading distinction between the two systems lies in answer to the question, What must one do to share the grace of God? The sacerdotalist says, "Go to the priest and receive the sacraments, which can only be administered by one who has been prelatically ordained." The evangelical says, "Go directly to Christ in repentance and faith and receive eternal life at his hands."

The Church of England, during the half-century following the reforming parliament of 1529, did not hold strenuously to the sacerdotal system of Rome. The prayer books of Edward and Elizabeth and the Thirty-nine Articles may be interpreted in a sense which favors the Roman theory of the priesthood, but

that interpretation is nullified by various facts. It is difficult for any one who is familiar with the mental attitude and temper of the reforming divines to believe that Hooker and Cranmer and Latimer did not reach a point which was very nearly the modern evangelical position. But we are not left to conjecture; all these men certainly recognized the theologians and pastors of the continent as the possessors of a ministry as valid as their own.<sup>3</sup>

The view, too, of Hooker in his *Ecclesiastical Polity* left the door open for the recognition of the Presbyterians of Geneva, the Lutherans of Saxony, and the Independents of Frankfort. He said:

I see that certain reformed churches, the Scottish especially and the French, have not that which best agreeth with the Holy Scripture—I mean the government that is by bishops—inasmuch as both those churches are fallen under a different kind of regimen, which to remedy it is for the one altogether too late, and too soon for the other during this present affliction and trouble; this their defect and imperfection I had rather lament in such a case than exagitate.<sup>4</sup>

And Bishop Lancelot Andrews (1555–1625) could write: “He is blind who doth not see churches existing without it [episcopacy]. He is hard-hearted who denieth them salvation. We are not so hard-hearted.”<sup>5</sup> As late as the reign of James I, Lord Bacon, in his Advertisement, characterized the denial that the Protestant pastors of the continent were “lawful ministers” as the crude and impertinent opinion of “some indiscreet persons.”<sup>6</sup>

Macaulay’s well-known summary of the position of the Church of England as to sacerdotalism during the Reformation and the generations immediately following it can hardly be gainsaid:

The Church of Rome held that Episcopacy was of divine institution and certain supernatural graces of a high order had been transmitted by

<sup>3</sup> William Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, vol. i, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> *Ecclesiastical Polity*, book iii, chap. 4.

<sup>5</sup> “Nec tamen si nostra divini juris sit, inde sequitur, vel quod sine ea salus non sit, vel quod stare non possit Ecclesia. Caecus sit, qui non videat stantes sine ea Ecclesias. Ferreus sit, qui salutem eis neget. Nos non sumus illi ferrei.” *Opuscula: Responsio ad epist. II Petri Molinaei*, edition of 1629, p. 176.

<sup>6</sup> Bacon’s Works, Montagu ed., vol. ii, p. 417.

the imposition of hands through fifty generations from the Eleven who received their commission on the Galilean Mount to the Bishops who met at Trent. A large body of Protestants, on the other hand, regarded prelacy as positively unlawful, and persuaded themselves that they found a very different form of ecclesiastical government prescribed in Scripture. The founders of the Anglican Church took a middle course. They retained episcopacy, but they did not declare it to be an institution essential to the welfare of a Christian society, or to the efficacy of the sacraments. Cranmer, indeed, on one occasion plainly avowed his conviction that, in the primitive times, there was no distinction between bishops and priests, and that the laying on of hands was altogether superfluous.<sup>7</sup>

The *jure divino* theory of Church polity was made a leading issue in England through the Presbyterian Cartwright. Calvin would have agreed with Hooker as to church government. Both would have said that the controlling factors in determining what polity was most advisable in given circumstances were reasonable deductions from Scripture and the experience of the ages, tempered by considerations of expediency. Cartwright, however, became so enamoured of Presbyterianism that he taught that the Presbyterian polity existed by divine right. Archbishop Bancroft took the same ground for episcopacy.<sup>8</sup> Bancroft himself was not consistent with this view in his own practice, but he sowed the seed. It did not immediately come to harvest, however. So late as 1518 James I recognized the standing of the non-episcopal churches by sending commissioners to the Synod of Dort. But the fruitage was not long delayed. Archbishop Laud (1573-1645) did for the Church of England what Strafford did for the monarchy. The churchmanship of Laud was not the churchmanship of Newman or R. H. Froude, but it was as exclusive in its claims of the necessity of episcopal ordination to constitute a true church or a valid celebration of the eucharist.

The extent to which the sacerdotal theory came to dominate the Church of England is shown by a comparison of the Act of Uniformity of 1662 (14 Charles II, cap. 4) with that of 1559 (1 Elizabeth, cap. 2). In these acts the Prayer Book is enforced with almost equal stringency. But the act of Elizabeth laid no such

<sup>7</sup> Macaulay, *History of England*, vol. i, pp. 58-59.

<sup>8</sup> A Sermon preached at Paules Crosse the 9 of Februarie, 1588.

stress upon episcopal ordination as the act of the Restoration parliament. The sacerdotal claim expressed in this Act was one of its principal grounds of offence to the deprived ministers. Howe, for example, made his objection to reordination a principal reason for his refusal to conform. He stated this to the Bishop of Exeter, and when the Bishop inquired how reordination could hurt him, Howe replied: "It hurts my *understanding*. . . Nothing can have two beginnings. I am sure I am a minister of Christ. I cannot begin again to be a minister."

The New England churches only gradually reached their independent position, though it was logically involved in their general attitude. The Plymouth Colony regarded John Robinson as pastor. There appears to be no evidence that the sacraments were observed before the coming of Lyford, and his disreputable career must have given a shock to any remaining sentiment that the impartation of grace could be in any way dependent on ordination. In the Massachusetts Bay Colony the first ministers had received episcopal ordination in the Church of England, but the events that had been taking place in England, the triumphs of the Presbyterians and Independents, the restoration of Charles II, and his Act of Uniformity, had dispelled the last fleecy cloud of sanctity from episcopal ordination. It is not wonderful that Judge Dudley, trained under the New England system, perfectly familiar with the course of events thus hastily surveyed, should have prescribed that the topic of one of the lecture courses he founded at Harvard College should be the defence of non-episcopal ordination.

It is unnecessary to follow the modern development of Sacerdotalism in the Church of England in the Tractarian and Ritualistic movements. It is sufficient to point out that the Gorham case (1849) settled the right of the Evangelicals within the Established Church, and the *Essays and Reviews* case did the same for the men of the Broad Church. A recent historian states the exact fact when he says: "The position taken by the highest courts is to this effect, that a clergyman may say and write what he pleases on theological matters, so long as he does not distinctly contradict the exact words of the Articles or the Prayer Book. The utmost freedom is now accorded the English clergy, all shades

of opinion abounding.”<sup>9</sup> It is probably just to say that while the Church of England is largely sacerdotal in practice, it is not necessarily so in doctrine.

In view of this survey we see exactly what the protest of this lectureship is. It is not against the episcopal ordination practiced by the Church of England any more than it is against a theory of Presbyterianism or Independency that would make such organizations the sole channel of divine grace. The protest is against any theory of the ministry or of the church which makes a given order of men or a given institution the necessary intermediary between the soul and Christ. The terms of Judge Dudley’s Foundation make this clear beyond question.

This protest may be vindicated on several distinct grounds.

I. The ground which Judge Dudley specifically mentioned deserves our attention. “The great Head of the Church, by his blessed Spirit, hath owned, sanctified, and blessed them [non-episcopal ordinations] accordingly, and will continue to do so to the end of the world.” Those who are outside the sacerdotal circle actually share the divine grace.

Purcell’s *Life of Cardinal Manning* is one of those biographies which, following the example of Froude’s *Carlyle*, discloses the reverse side of the tapestry quite as much as the pictured. Frequently, towards the close of his life, the Cardinal writes in a tone of disillusionment as to the practical working of the Roman system. I cite Manning’s confession because it so admirably vindicates in our modern world the contention of our founder that the administration of the sacraments or ordinances of religion at the hands of those episcopally ordained is not in the least necessary for the possession of divine grace. Manning wrote August 5, 1890:

My experience among those who are out of the Church confirms all that I have written of the doctrines of grace. I have intimately known souls living by faith, hope, and charity, and the sanctifying Grace with the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, in humility, absolute purity of heart and life, in constant meditation on Holy Scripture, unceasing prayer, complete self-denial, personal work among the poor; in a word, living lives of visible sanctification, as undoubtedly the work of the Holy Ghost

<sup>9</sup> Newman, *Church History*, vol. ii, p. 658.

as I have ever seen. I have seen this in whole families, rich and poor, and in all conditions of life. . . .

And further, all the great works of charity in England have had their beginning out of the Church, for instance, the abolition of the slave trade and of slavery; and the persevering protest of the Anti-Slavery Society. Not a Catholic name so far as I know shared in this. France, Portugal, and Brazil have been secretly or openly slave trading or, till now even, slave holding. The whole Temperance movement. It was a Quaker that made F. Mathew a total abstainer. Catholic Ireland and the Catholics of England, until now, have done little for temperance. The Anglican and Dissenting ministers are far more numerous total abstainers than our priests. The Act of Parliament to protect animals from cruelty was carried by a non-Catholic Irishman. The Anti-Vivisection Act also. Both are derided to my knowledge among Catholics. The Acts to protect children from cruelty were the work of Dissenters. On these three Societies there is hardly a Catholic name. On the last, mine was for long the only one. So again in the uprising against the horrible depravity which destroys young girls—multitudes of ours—I was literally denounced by Catholics; not one came forward. If it was ill done why did nobody try to mend it? I might go on. There are endless works for the protection of shop assistants, overworked railway and tram men, women and children ground down by sweaters, and driven by starvation wage upon the streets. Not one of the works in their behalf were started by us; hardly a Catholic name is to be found in their Reports. Surely we are in the Sacristy. It is not that our Catholics deliberately refuse, but partly they do not take pains to know; partly they are prejudiced. "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" Partly they are suspicious. "Who knows it is not a proselytising affair?" And finally they live on easily, unconscious that Lazarus lies at their gate full of sores.<sup>10</sup>

A thorough-going sacerdotalist probably would reply to the argument based on the fact that apparently the fruits of grace are found in those who have never received it through priestly channels, that there are results of grace, and these the most important, which are scarcely manifest in the temporal order, only in the eternal realm. They would say with the author of Tract XXXV (probably John Henry Newman himself):

A person not commissioned from the bishop may use the words of baptism, and sprinkle or bathe with water *on earth*, but there is no promise from Christ that such a man shall admit souls to the Kingdom of Heaven.

<sup>10</sup> Purcell, *Life of Cardinal Manning*, vol. ii, pp. 780-781.

A person not commissioned may break bread and pour out wine and pretend to give the Lord's Supper, but it can afford no comfort to any to receive it at his hands, because there is no warrant from Christ to lead communicants to suppose that while he does so here *on earth* they will be partakers in the Savior's *heavenly* body and blood.<sup>11</sup>

But is it not a sufficient answer to such a line of reasoning to say that the government of God is a unity, and that the same moral principles control in this world or in any realm of existence that God has created? Just as fire burning in your grate is the same as fire in the remotest fixed stars, so justice, love, and fellowship with God are the same in all realms. Salvation is the same experience in all souls. It is not only deliverance from punishment; it is not only transportation into an ideal environment. At heart and in essence it is fellowship with God, and deliverance from evil and all the anticipations we associate with heaven are the concomitants and sequences of that fellowship. The author of the Twenty-third Psalm had a deep insight into this truth when he wrote:

Yea, though I walk through the valley of death,  
I will fear no evil; for thou art with me.

And the author of this psalm based his confidence of fellowship with God in the future upon the fact that he had the evidence and the consciousness of that fellowship now.

The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want.  
He maketh me to lie down in green pastures.  
He leadeth me beside the still waters. He restoreth my soul.  
He guideth me in the paths of righteousness for his name's sake.

The Christian thought of our time is apprehending this truth of the unity of life and the unity of the divine government with more clearness than ever before. It is the great inference from monotheism which men have been reluctant to draw.

When one traverses a continent to meet a friend whom he has never seen but from whom he has received great benefits and by whose counsels he has been guided; when Emerson crosses the

<sup>11</sup> Quoted by H. C. Sheldon, *Sacerdotalism*, New York, 1909.

Atlantic and greets Carlyle; the past experience of fellowship and sympathy is the basis of the deeper relationship growing out of the larger opportunity. We do not know how the eternal realm differs from that of the earth, but we are absolutely certain of the unity of personal life and the identity of spiritual principles. The word of a priest, no matter what his credentials or how precise his ritual, asserting that by something he has done for us our souls are brought into fellowship with God, is so slight and trivial that it is unmeaning compared with the witness of God's spirit that one is accepted of Christ and is in spiritual fellowship with him, or compared with the fact that one is guided by his principles, manifests his temper, and obeys his word. It seems as if our Lord taught precisely this when he said: "If ye love me, keep my commandments. He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me, and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him."

II. Another consideration deserves attention, viz., that sacerdotalism obscures the broad distinction between the church and the kingdom of God and their relations. The church occupies a small place comparatively in the New Testament; Jesus refers to it only three times. Generally, the word *ecclesia* denotes the local company of believers. For political reasons Paul seldom employed the term "kingdom," instead of *ecclesia*. In the letter to the Ephesians, especially, he idealized the *ecclesia* until its content approximated the conception of Jesus when he spoke of "the kingdom." But the two ideas are entirely distinct. The church is the means for promoting the interests of the kingdom. Men are not in the church to be brought into the kingdom; they should be in the church because they are in the kingdom.

The kingdom is the principal topic of our Lord's parables and discourses. When his disciples came asking what should be the chief objects of human desire, he gave them the Prayer of the Kingdom. When the question was put to him: "What is the *summum bonum*?" he said, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness." And the kingdom of God is conformity of the spirit and life of the individual and of all the activities

of related individuals to the divine ideal. The kingdom of God comes on earth through the obedience of earth to the divine will as heaven obeys it. "The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit." The passage just quoted from Cardinal Manning, in which he describes the temper and the good works of many of those whom he had known outside of his own communion, is an excellent outline of the spirit and purposes and conduct which characterize membership in the kingdom of God. The conditions of this heavenly citizenship are not at all formal or ritualistic; they are spiritual and moral.

The discovery in the New Testament of this doctrine of the kingdom has been the source of some of the strongest inspirations and deepest insights granted to the religious life of our age. We have come to recognize the primacy of the petition that God's kingdom may come and his will be done on earth as it is in heaven. This conception has delivered us from that extreme form of other-worldliness which Byron satirized when he wrote:<sup>12</sup>

" Deep in yon cave Honorius long did dwell,  
In hope to merit heaven by making earth a hell."

The doctrine of the kingdom compels us to ask, Who are the proper members of the kingdom? What are the characteristics of a citizen? Or to put it in another way, What manner of person is a good man? What is the true notion of saintship? The Sermon on the Mount is principally devoted to answering that question. But the mediaeval church ignored and forgot the answer of Jesus.

In the view of the mediaevalist the world and the forces of human history are essentially antagonistic to the soul made in the image of God. Man does not realize his true worth in the historic process but by being lifted out of it and above it into a vague supernatural realm. Asceticism is the logical conclusion of this outlook upon life. One of the fundamental distinctions between Romanism and Protestantism is as to this relation of man to nature and the processes of history. Protestant-

<sup>12</sup> Childe Harold, canto i, stanza xx.

ism has not denied that "the world" is in many ways antagonistic to the soul, but at the same time it regards the physical, social, industrial environments in which the lot of men is cast, their place in the historic process, as the field on which men are to manifest devotion to God and their fellows. This is the arena on which sainthood is to be won, and it is to be achieved not by withdrawing one's self from the common duties and relationships of life, but by using them nobly. To one of this cast of thought a merchant or manufacturer who illustrates the Christian temper in his relations to his employees, his customers, and the public, who is living to God as a business man, is just as much entitled to the term "spiritual" as the clergyman or the deaconess.

For the mediaevalist the ideal of the spiritual life is conveyed in unforgettable form in the pages of Thomas à Kempis's *Imitatio*. In that book the antithesis between the spirit and the world is sharpened. The natural desires and emotions are to be stoutly repressed. Interest in the affairs of daily life is condemned. The entire ideal is ascetic. The antithesis between the spiritual life and the life which the Greeks described as "according to nature" is emphasized to an extreme.

The modern ideal is not, perhaps, illustrated in any formal book, but it shows itself clearly in the personal life of Martin Luther, a husband and father, a friend and neighbor, endeavoring to carry into these relations, however imperfectly he succeeded at times, the temper of the Gospel. This ideal is finely exemplified in the modern Christian business man who wins wealth by legitimate means, who uses it to promote many good causes, who gives not only his money but himself to them, who is without reproach as an employer, a neighbor, a citizen, or a Christian. Simeon Stylites is the mediaeval saint; the modern saint is David Livingstone,—explorer, scientist, civilizer, and missionary,—a man who laid the foundations of the kingdom of God in a whole continent.

The mediaeval ideal of sainthood is given in Parkman's description of Jeanne le Ber, the saint of Montreal.<sup>13</sup> The modern ideal of sainthood is represented by a wife and mother who interpenetrates all her duties and relationships with the Christian motive

<sup>13</sup> The Old Régime in Canada, pp. 356-358.

and temper. And this is the ideal of the Sermon on the Mount. The spiritual is not the unearthly but the truly normal.

Membership in the kingdom of God means a life of this kind, and not translation into a vague supernatural realm at variance with the natural order. It means being a good man according to the ideal of Jesus, and the conditions of achieving this goodness are not at all formal or ritual; they are ethical and spiritual. The gospel is not a system of magic by which one may be brought into a life of goodness independently of his own co-operation. The gospel is a message to the intellect, to the affections, and to the will, and no one receives its grace until he makes an intelligent, affectionate, and resolute response to it. No one can exercise faith for another any more than he can see or love for another.

The supreme function of the church is to extend the kingdom of God by bringing to men the message of revelation. Only those who are loyal subjects of the kingdom fulfil the conditions for membership in the church, or minister to the function of the church. Whatever formal or ritual observances may be associated with church membership, the essential condition, without which everything else is worthless, is membership in the kingdom of God.

To one who holds this conception of the church and of the kingdom, and of their mutual relation, the church has no grace to impart. There is no mysterious, magical power conveyed through any of its officers or any of its ceremonies. What the church does is to witness to the truth and to proclaim the revelation of God in Christ, and, since revelation is not revelation unless it is understood, the principal function of the church is making an appeal to the moral natures of men. And the grace of God is imparted to men through that response of self to the Gospel. The church has no treasures of grace. She is not commissioned to impart anything except the truth, to which she witnesses by teaching and example, and when she leads men to embrace it, the grace of God, imparted by himself, comes into the self-surrendered life.

While a church polity and government are amply justified, and we may even, for the sake of argument, concede that there is an ideal polity, all considerations of government or orders are

purely external and subordinate. They are secondary agencies. The primary agency is the divine spirit awakening a response within human hearts which leads them to co-operate with God. In his best moments Luther described faith as "the personal apprehension of Christ's living presence with the heart and the entire surrender to his power." It is personal faith that becomes the tangent point between the soul and Christ, and the channel of divine grace. As Luther said, there is no priesthood except the priesthood of all believers. "There is one mediator between God and men, himself man, Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all" (1 Tim. 2 5).

III. Our protest also derives great force from a worthy conception of the divine character. By the practical exigencies of human life, the Roman obedience, which carries the sacerdotal theory to an extreme development, has not only admitted the validity of lay baptism but has anathematized those who deny it. This anathema is a magnificent demonstration of the power of a worthy conception of God to destroy a narrow theory. On the Roman assumption that baptism was essential to salvation, any worthy conception of God made it impossible to tolerate the view that the salvation of men was dependent on the act of a priest, who might be physically unable to administer the rite. This breach in the sacerdotal theory indicates the fatal argument against it. The only alternative to the recognition of lay baptism was that baptism is in no wise essential to salvation, and that, in our judgment, was the true position. The Roman church was unable to go to that extent, but it did strike a mortal blow to thorough-going sacerdotalism in its recognition of lay baptism.

In the discussion of the divine character any considerations drawn from a minute exegesis of Scripture or from the interpretations and practices of antiquity seem to be irrelevant. The caution of Lord Bacon is of force:

It were better to have no opinion of God at all than such as is unworthy of Him, for the one is unbelief, the other is contumely, and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity. Plutarch well saith to that purpose: "Surely, I had rather a great deal that men should say there was no such man as Plutarch, than that they should say that there

was one Plutarch that would eat his children as soon as they were born." <sup>14</sup>

Erasmus gave beautiful and classic expression to the immediacy of the divine help in his colloquy on the Shipwreck. The ship has struck and everyone is in alarm.

A. Did they pray meanwhile?

B. Earnestly. One sang, *Salve regina!* another, *Credo in Deum.* Some there were who had special prayers, not unlike magic formulas against danger.

A. How religious we are in times of affliction! In times of prosperity neither God nor saints come into our head. What were you doing all this time? Did you offer vows to none of the saints?

B. Not one.

A. But you sought the protection of some saint?

B. Not even that.

A. Why not?

B. Because heaven is a large place. If I commend myself to some saint,—St. Peter, for example, who is most likely to hear me first of all, since he stands at the door,—before he goes to God and explains my case, I shall be already lost.

A. What did you do then?

B. I went immediately to the Father himself, saying: "Our Father who art in heaven." None of the saints hears sooner than he, and none gives more willingly what is asked.

Is it not true that we may go directly to God, that his relationship to the soul is immediate, and that repentance and faith are the only conditions of receiving his choicest blessing? Is it not true that a company of shipwrecked sailors on a desert island whose hearts have been moved toward God in self-surrender by studying a New Testament that has been saved from the sea, may form a church as "valid," in any rational sense of the word "valid," as any church that ever existed, and may celebrate the sacraments in a way as acceptable to God and as profitable to themselves as any enthroned bishop or mitred abbot can minister these symbols? Why is not the principle that the Roman church has admitted in regard to baptism to be applied in case of necessity to all rites of religion?

<sup>14</sup> Bacon, *Essays*, "On Superstition."

But, it may be replied, however this position may be justified from a theoretical point of view, as a matter of historical fact has not the divine grace been mediated to men through specific channels? Was there not under Judaism a chosen people and a restricted priesthood? Is not the burden of the Old Testament the peculiar relationship of Israel to the Most High, one shared by no other race or people?

All this might be admitted, but when we argue from the Old Testament that similar conditions prevail in Christian times, we overlook the distinctive note of universality that Christianity introduced into the whole conception of religion. It was given to Peter, by nature one of the most narrow and exclusive of our Lord's first disciples, to see that "God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is acceptable to him." The Epistles to the Hebrews and to the Galatians lose most of their significance if the grace of God is dependent on any human means or order whatever. It is interesting to observe with what painful art the New Testament must be treated to draw from it any conclusion but that the main thing, so transcending all others that in comparison with it they become almost negligible, is the personal attitude of the individual soul toward God. This is the true universality of Christianity. In its heart and essence it emancipates itself from all externalities and, as Luther saw, brings the human soul into direct personal relationship with God in Christ.

But does not this view disparage the place of the church in the Christian religion? To some it may appear to have this result, but it only does so by remanding the church to its true place and indicating its proper function. Immense mischief has been done by conceiving of the church as composed of those who are to receive the Christian life because they are members of it, instead of being composed of those who are members of it because they have received divine grace. From this point of view the church is only in a limited and secondary sense a channel of grace; it is primarily a witness and a seal to grace. And so, when we come to the question with which we are specifically concerned, ordination, whether episcopal or that of Geneva or of Scotland, only formally, externally, creates a ministry. The creation, as

Hooker clearly saw, is by the call and the grace of Christ, and the act of the bishop or of the presbytery or of the council or of the single church simply authenticates and attests, so far as prayerful human judgment may, the reality of the divine call. But the grace that resides in the ministry, and is transmitted through it, is not imparted to men by men through any process whatever; it comes to the man from the Risen Lord, and seals a human ministry with divine tokens.

STRZYGOWSKI AND HIS THEORY OF EARLY  
CHRISTIAN ART

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The study of the monuments of the early centuries of the Christian Era has hitherto received its inspiration from one or other of two sources. Christian scholars, like De Rossi and Wilpert and Kraus, have been interested in the subject because of its Christian content and significance, and classical scholars, like Wickhoff and Riegl, have studied the monuments of this period as the expiring forms of classic art. Both classes of scholars have, in great measure, confined their observations to the monuments of Italy, especially to those of Rome and to the distinctly Roman provinces. Against this point of view that "All roads lead to Rome," a new battle-cry is raised, "*Ex oriente lux*." It is not to Rome, but to Alexandria and Egypt, Ephesus and Asia Minor, Antioch and Syria, Jerusalem and Palestine, that we must look for the solution of early Christian and mediæval art. The new champion is Dr. Josef Strzygowski, and he is gathering adherents amongst the younger writers in various German universities.

We assume that little is known about Strzygowski in this country. His works are not translated into English and his name does not yet figure in our biographical dictionaries. From the German *Wer ist's?* we gather a few biographical details. He was born in 1862 at Biala in Galicia, near Bielitz in Austrian Silesia; his father was a manufacturer, his mother, Edle von Friedenfeldt, belonged to a family raised to the nobility by Charles VI. He received his education at the Realschule at Jena, the Gymnasium at Vienna, and the Universities of Vienna, Berlin, and Munich. Prior to his university studies he had gone

into the manufacturing business, but broke away and determined to become a scholar in 1883. In 1895 he married Elfriede Hofmann, and has had four children. Their names, Elfi, Sese, Senta, Nora, are not uninteresting.

An adequate appreciation of Strzygowski through his works would be no easy task. His articles cover a wide field and are scattered in many scientific periodicals; his books are rapidly increasing in number, but his most important work, a General History of Byzantine Art, is not yet published. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with calling attention to a few examples of his work, especially to such as will give some notion of his theory of early Christian art.

In 1885 he published his *Iconographie der Taufe Christi*. This book was published in Munich, was dedicated to Heinrich von Brunn and to Anton Springer, and is apparently a developed doctor's thesis. Nowhere else can one find so full a treatment of the representations of the Baptism of Christ. The 169 illustrations give it the character of a *Corpus*, especially in the early periods of Christian history. Not content with early Christian, Byzantine, Lombard, and Carolingian representations, he traces his theme down to the beginning of the Renaissance in German, French, English, Flemish, and Italian sources. His comprehensive command of material and his careful attention to all the variations of his theme resulted in making this volume a model of that "*Detailforschung*," without which as a foundation general treatises have little value. It may be noted in passing that in this volume, apart from the emphasis given to Byzantine, Russian, and German monuments, there is evinced no oriental or anti-roman bias.

Less comprehensive in scope, but equally careful in treatment, is his study entitled *Calenderbilder des Chronographen vom Jahre 354*, published as *Ergänzungsheft No. 1* of the *Jahrbuch des kaiserlich-deutschen archaologischen Instituts*, 1888. In this case he is examining a manuscript ultimately of Roman origin, but is led to distinguish between the ancient calendars of the East and those of the West. The study of this class of miniatures is thus leading him to observe the characteristics of oriental miniatures in contrast to those of Roman origin.

During the two years from April, 1888, to April, 1890, the young scholar made his *Studienreise*, visiting Salonica, Mount Athos, Athens, Constantinople, the west coast of Asia Minor, the Caucasus, St. Petersburg, and Moscow. This journey gave him an opportunity of personally inspecting many Byzantine monuments, inspired a series of articles, and deepened a resolve to devote his chief energies to a comprehensive History of Byzantine Art. After his return from this journey we find him in 1891 installed as privat-dozent in the History of Art at the University of Vienna, a position from which he was called in 1892 to a professorship in the University at Graz. His *Byzantinische Denkmäler* (1891-1903) represent very inadequately his activity at this period. Here he published the important Armenian Evangelary from Etschmiadzin, as a prelude to a general discussion of Armenian miniature painting. Here also, in collaboration with Professor Forchheimer, he gave a detailed and historical account of the cisterns of Constantinople. Constantinople in his view does not represent a source of new art motives. It was a new Rome, a maelstrom of classic and oriental forms, a receiving and distributing centre for many centuries. The cisterns point to Alexandria as an important source of the complex product known as Byzantine art. Ten years elapsed between the publication of the second and third volumes of the *Byzantinische Denkmäler*, and to this third volume Strzygowski contributes only a general introduction on the Rise and Triumph of Byzantine Art. The remainder of the volume is the work of his pupils. But for our purposes the catalogue of Strzygowski's writings at the end of the volume is of special interest. Here he has enumerated only such articles as are concerned with the history of oriental art and published between the years 1885 and 1903. They are no less than 71 in number, distributed as follows: 3 are of general character, 15 have reference to Egypt, 10 to Syria and Palestine, 10 to Asia Minor, 8 to Constantinople and Thrace, 2 to Salonica and Macedonia, 6 to Greece, 5 to the West in its relation to the East, and 12 deal with iconography and miscellaneous subjects. When we remember that during this period was founded the *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, a periodical to which Strzygowski has been from the outset a constant contributor of articles, notes,

and numberless reviews, we begin to form some notion of the great mental activity of a man already well occupied with university lecturing and other official duties. The volume entitled *Orient oder Rom*, bearing the date 1901, is not only an excellent sample of his works, but illustrates also the ever-growing tendency in his mind to emphasize the Orient and to diminish the importance of Rome as a factor in the civilization and art of the early centuries of our era. In the introduction he attacks the theories of Wickhoff, as believing in the development of a specifically Roman art during the first three centuries of the Christian Era, while admitting oriental influences during the fourth and fifth centuries; Kraus, on the other hand, he represents as believing that Alexandria was the formative influence for the first three centuries, and that Rome then became the centre throughout the entire period of the Middle Ages. To these theories Strzygowski opposes his own. Kraus, he holds, is right in recognizing oriental influences in the early period and wrong in emphasizing Rome for the later; Wickhoff is right in recognizing the Orient in the later period, wrong in supposing that there was any specifically Roman art in the first three centuries. Stated baldly, whoever explains Christian art through the Orient is right, whoever raises the banner for Rome is wrong. This is the point of view for which henceforth Strzygowski becomes a violent partisan. The four articles which make up the remainder of the volume are specific interpretations of this general view. The first relates to a Palmyrene tomb dating from the year 259 A.D. The plan of the tomb, its vaults, and its decoration, he contends are not Roman, but hellenistic. This, however, might readily be granted even by the advocates of Roman art. The second article describes a *Christus-relief* in the Berlin Museum, which he properly classes with other similar sculptures as exhibiting hellenistic and specifically Asia-Minor sources of inspiration. This might also be admitted without denying all individuality to Roman art. Then follows an article on a figured fragment of wood-sculpture from Egypt. The types here figured have some analogy with those on the Helena sarcophagus in the Vatican and with some well-known ivory carvings in Paris and elsewhere, but the reasoning in support of the thesis that these types are all of

Egyptian origin is inconclusive. The fourth article concerns what are popularly known as Coptic tapestries with Christian subjects, a little-appreciated class of objects which may readily have exerted an important influence upon later ecclesiastical wall painting and window-glass decoration. As nearly all these textiles have been found in Egypt and the types represented are not specifically Roman, the contention that they belong to the Christian art of the Orient will not be seriously contested. The final article treats of Important Remains of Constantine's Building on the Site of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. The important remains here referred to are portions of an ancient decorated cornice, analogous in style to architectural remains at Damascus, Palmyra, and Baalbec, and referable in this case to a portion of the building erected by Constantine himself. This cornice, he concludes, very properly, is non-roman in style. It belongs to a family, the other members of which are found in Syria and in Egypt, but not in Rome. The domical building and the basilica erected here by Constantine, and designed to be more beautiful than any other, give to Jerusalem an importance in the history of art which is often forgotten. But it does not necessarily follow that Strzygowski is right in looking to Jerusalem for the origin of the basilica or in his belief that from Jerusalem Christian art as well as Christianity itself radiated to the ends of the earth.

In 1903 he published his *Kleinasien*, the sub-title of which, *Ein Neuland der Kunstgeschichte*, was expressly designed to attract attention. This is not a work inspired by his own explorations, for the materials of the volume consist of photographs and plans taken by G. I. Smirnov in 1895 and by G. W. Crowfoot and J. G. C. Anderson in 1900. Strzygowski, however, publishes and explains the significance of the revelations of these explorers in central and southern Asia Minor. It is not easy in a few words to summarize the contents of this volume, and a very brief sketch must suffice. Strzygowski distinguishes between the art of the coast cities and that of the interior. The coast cities were in communication by sea with the chief cities of the hellenistic world. Near the coast, therefore, we are apt to find throughout a longer period basilicas oriented towards the East, preceded by atria, and covered by wooden roofs; whereas in the interior

oriental features, derived from the earlier civilizations, are widespread. Here we find, for example, churches with two towers on the façade, recalling Hittite and Jewish prototypes; doors and windows piercing the lateral walls, as in Syria; compound piers, instead of columns; arches instead of architraves; vaults in place of coffered wooden ceilings. These oriental characteristics make their way to the coast and thence spread to the western world. Asia Minor becomes therefore, with Syria, an important source of inspiration not only for Byzantine, but for mediaeval European architecture. As compared with the churches of northern and central Syria, those of Asia Minor are not inscribed with their dates, hence the dating problem is more difficult, although Strzygowski is probably right in referring some of these buildings to a period as early as the fourth century. In Asia Minor, besides the basilica various buildings of central construction are found; octagons with and without galleries, octagons pierced by the cross as described by Gregory of Nyssa, the domed basilica (*Kuppelbasilica*) and the domed cruciform church (*Kreuzkuppelkirche*). The domed cruciform church appears to have existed in Armenia as early as the time of Nerses III (640-661), later became a popular Byzantine type, and from Constantinople may have spread to Asia Minor as well as to Venice and western France. The revelation of this series of churches in the heart of Asia Minor establishes for the history of architecture a new link connecting the East and the West.

Sculpture and painting for this period in Asia Minor are still largely an unknown quantity, though the few examples accessible reflect a similar mixture of hellenistic and oriental qualities. Rome, as an artistic power in Asia Minor, may now be set aside.

The concluding chapter of this volume treats of the origin of Romanesque art, and points out in rather unsystematic fashion the many oriental features which found their way into European art. These influences, he believes, came not through Rome, but direct from the Orient to such distributing centres as Ravenna, Milan, and Marseilles. In the Carlovingian empire oriental and Germanic ideals met and formed a new product analogous to that established at Byzantium by the intermingling of oriental with Hellenic aims. If any one would like to follow Strzygowski

further in this direction, let him read his pamphlet entitled *Der Dom zu Aachen und seine Entwicklung* (1904), where the oriental character of the great Carlovingian church is developed in detail.

The year 1904 marks the publication of two important works by Strzygowski, one a detailed catalogue of the Coptic monuments in the Cairo Museum, entitled *Koptische Kunst*, the other an exhaustive study of the ruins of *Mschatta*, published in the *Jahrbuch der königlich-preussischen Kunstsammlungen*, 1904, pp. 225-373. To the one, scholars will turn for accurate knowledge of the little-known but important field of Coptic sculpture, to the other for types of elaborate decorative motives which spread from Mesopotamia both east and west. The magnificent slabs of sculptured ornament from *Mschatta*, now the pride of the Berlin Museum, aroused Strzygowski's enthusiasm to the highest pitch. His appreciation of these sculptures and his instrumentality in bringing them to Europe he considers one of his most important works. *Mschatta* is not a Christian monument, but it is henceforth to be reckoned with in the history of Christian art as furnishing the most striking example of certain types of ornament found on Christian monuments in the West.

Strzygowski's general theory of Christian art is developed somewhat systematically in Schiele's *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, now in course of publication. The article *Altchristliche Kunst* is by Strzygowski, and appeared in 1908. The first three centuries of our era he describes as the hellenistic period. Jerusalem was the starting-point. From the synagogue was derived the Christian basilica; from the tombs of Palestine came the cruciform ground-plan; and from the East, also, buildings of circular and polygonal plan. Sculpture and painting were likewise hellenistic. From Asia Minor came the typical forms of Roman sarcophagi; from Alexandria and Antioch the artistic motives in catacomb paintings and early miniatures. Carthage, Alexandria, Antioch, Ephesus, the important centres, suffered from disastrous earthquakes. Rome was more fortunate in the preservation of her monuments. The second period, covering the second three centuries, is described as the oriental period. During this period Rome stagnates, Constantinople becomes not only the centre of the Empire, but also of artistic activity. Hel-

lenistic types cease to develop, or are fused with oriental forms from Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, Armenia, and Mesopotamia. The monasteries of Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor are now exerting a wide influence. With their spread come the oriental types of buildings, with towered façades, vaults, and domes; oriental methods in sculpture and painting, substituting historical for the mythological and symbolic treatment of religious themes; and various oriental arts, such as ivory carvings, mosaics, and enamels. From Syria and from Egypt come such important types as the bearded Christ and the enthroned Mary. The later periods he treats under the headings, Islam, Byzantium, the West. The taste for fine ornament without human elements, which characterized the art of Islam, was at once anti-hellenic and anti-christian and was derived from the interior of Western Asia. Byzantium looked to Asia Minor for the architects of such important buildings as Hagia Sophia and the Church of the Apostles, and adopted many Armenian and Persian types of ornament. Western Europe, after being deeply impressed with a *Schmuckstil* consisting largely of glass inlays derived from Persia and of braid ornaments from Armenia and Mesopotamia, entered upon the so-called Romanesque period, during which architectural, sculptural, and pictorial types were predominantly oriental in character. In all this development Rome had little or no share. Strzygowski concludes with a recommendation to theologians and to all readers of the new encyclopaedia to revise their conceptions in all directions. It is interesting to note that in an appended bibliography he mentions a half-dozen authors as having entirely erroneous views, and commends the reading of some seventeen of his own writings.

It has been our purpose to state rather than to criticise Strzygowski's general theory. We may, however, allow ourselves a few general remarks. Rome, as a cradle of Christian art, is too firmly established to be easily set aside as having a powerful influence on mediaeval and subsequent art. The spread of the Roman church throughout Europe carried with it, almost of necessity, the art forms with which that cult was associated. How much of the early art in Italy was due to initiative of Italian artists and how much was borrowed, is a question to be deter-

mined by the most careful study of specific examples. Rivoira, in his monumental work on Lombardic Architecture, has given us the best general treatise from the Italian point of view. His patriotic spirit impels him to find in Italy the origins of subsequent European art, and it is surprising to find how many prototypes of later architecture may be found without leaving the confines of Italy. On the other hand, Italy had been saturated from time immemorial with oriental and with classic influences, due to the influx of foreign artists, to the importation of foreign works of art, and to the impression made upon the minds of Roman conquerors by the great monuments of the older civilizations. However, an absolute antithesis between Rome on the one hand and the Orient on the other is an unfortunate one. Even more evidently than Alexandria and Ephesus and Antioch, Rome reflects both hellenistic and oriental influences. As our knowledge of the East increases, it becomes more and more clear that Rome was not the only centre of early Christian art. The value of Strzygowski's work consists, not in his attacks on classical or Christian scholars, but in the enthusiasm and the energy with which his scholarly efforts have opened up new vistas into the art of Asia Minor and Armenia, Syria, Egypt, and Constantinople. He has already given us so many important views of special portions of the field that we may look forward with ever-increasing interest to the promised general History of Byzantine Art, as one of the monumental works in the history of Christian art.

*A NEW NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION*<sup>1</sup>

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That religion has a natural history, being included under the concepts that constitute the sciences of biology, psychology, and sociology, may by this time be assumed without argument. Details of the movement remain to be determined, but there is no longer any occasion to ask whether religion, or some form of it, is interpolated into the system of nature. But to adopt a principle is not the same as to apply it consistently. In spite of good intentions, remnants of the older view become incorporated into our would-be scientific structures. As instances, Professor King, in the book under review, specifies Max Müller's "perception of the infinite," Morris Jastrow's "religious instinct," Tiele's "innate sense of infinity," Brinton's postulate of "a religiosity of man as a part of his psychical being," and the theological notion of the gradual revelation of a specific and so-to-say pre-determined idea of God. In all these King sees only so many interpolations. They inject a formed religious consciousness into history, instead of explaining the genesis of the consciousness itself. The author therefore undertakes to show how religion first emerges out of a pre-religious type of life, and how ceremonial, the gods, and the development of high religions can all be fully accounted for by strictly natural conditions. Whether or not all his conclusions are convincing, he has produced a book that must be reckoned with. For not only does he attack a fundamental problem in a radical manner; not only has he collected a rich fund of anthropological material; he also brings to the analysis of this material the learning and the methods of a trained psychologist. The book is noteworthy, also, for the tenacity with which it follows the social clew to the origin and development of religion as opposed to all theories that give large

<sup>1</sup> Irving King, *The Development of Religion: A Study in Anthropology and Social Psychology*. New York, The Macmillan Company. 1910. pp. xxiv, 371.

place to emotional and intellectual reactions that are aroused by the phenomena of nature.

The central idea of the work is that religious states of mind arise from antecedent "overt" acts called forth from the psychophysical organism by the conditions of existence, particularly social existence. "The lack of a psychological basis is evident in practically all discussions of religious phenomena. . . . Nearly all are one-sided on account of the failure to take account of the reaction as the fundamental psychic unit." In the words of Goethe, "*Im Anfang war die That.*" Among social activities that are simple and natural responses to specific environmental conditions, certain ones may be called religious practices. They originate from no religious motive, aspiration, or antecedent of any kind, but they awaken a type of consciousness that is religious. What, then, are these spontaneous religious practices? Not those that serve an immediate biological utility, but rather accessory acts or chance accompaniments of utility-acts, sports and festivals expressing emotional overflow, and acts intermediate to relatively remote ends. They all represent values, but the values of more or less reflective appreciation rather than those of immediate pains and pleasures. By association of ideas these activities take on the importance of the primary utility-acts, and by imitation they are repeated and consolidated into a relatively distinct body. Thus the religious reaction is "secondary to a social process of some sort originating in other than a religious need."

If, then, we will retrace the evolution of religion, we must go backward from individual religious consciousness to a strictly social consciousness; from religious consciousness to religious group-practices; and these practices we shall find to be a sort of "aside" that has differentiated itself from the primary adjustment-reactions. Back of all religion, moreover, we reach an undifferentiated social existence that is non-religious.

The earliest development of the religious consciousness proceeds through the apparently universal primitive belief in a "mysterious power" (manitou, wakonda, orenda, mana, etc.) that can bless or injure. This power, King says, is impersonal and quasi-mechanical. If by animism is meant the notion that

things are spirits or the abode of spirits, then animism is not the earliest type of thought. Men must have undergone a considerable mental development before they could form the concept of spirit or person. For the same reason, however, they could not at first form the idea of the impersonal. We may therefore question whether King's repeated declaration that the "mysterious power" is impersonal is not an expression of his own distinction-making mind rather than of the standpoint of the primitive mind. In any case, King maintains, the "power" is not distinctly either religious or magical, but it is capable of playing into the hands of either religion or magic. Religion did not arise through the breakdown of magical control of the "power," for magic and religion coexist, and both use the "power." They shade into each other. Yet they differ in that religion is a more distinctly social development, an affair of the group, while magic is predominantly an individual affair. King makes many acute suggestions as to the probable rise of various magical practices. As in the case of religion, so here, the real explanation is no general principle such as the "sympathetic" view of spatial or causal connections, but rather accessory, or excess, or anticipatory, activities which by association and imitation acquire the importance of the central utility-act.

The appearance of deities is a direct consequence of social organization. The most primitive form of religion is simply the regulative social structure. "Whether there is also present a religious *consciousness* or not, is a matter of indifference." But because religious values are fundamentally social they had to be expressed at least in personal terms. The gods are not nature-powers that have been personified, but symbols of social valuations. Worship, too, is not based upon a mere analogy of social relations; it is itself a portion of the social activity. The ancestor-god simply perpetuates the family relations. Animals and other objects became gods because they seemed to possess the "power," and the favorable or unfavorable use of the "power" could be thought of in no other terms than those of friendliness or unfriendliness, the more so that many of the gods, without doubt, were simply men who had seemed to have an extraordinary portion of the "power."

Any profound change in the social interests of a group, as a transformation of industries, produces a corresponding change in the gods. Then the old gods are likely to grow dim, generalized, the "high gods of low religions"—high, not because of any function they perform, but because of their high abstractedness. Thus the actual social life is the universally controlling factor. Religion has no identity or continuity of its own; higher forms do not evolve out of lower; there is no true natural series in such successions as polytheism, henotheism, monotheism; rather, religion is nothing but the flowing product of social forces that are continuous.

All this applies to ethical monotheism, as to lower forms. The notion that there is one only god is not primarily an intellectual achievement; it arises neither through speculation nor through observation of the uniformities of nature, but by way of an intense and unified social consciousness. If a god, even a tribal god, fills the horizon of his worshippers, he is to them ultimate, supreme, functionally a *monotheos*. Even the Yahweh of the later prophets represents rather psychological than metaphysical monotheism. His high moral character, too, not less than his unity, has its roots in the social life of the people. "Primitive morals and primitive religion are but two sides of the same thing," and the primitive *ethos*, as King is careful to show, contains all the fundamental human virtues. These virtues, all through their development, are reflected into the gods, and the unrealized effort after goodness also reflects itself in the ideal qualities of the divine.

Thus we have in principle a complete natural history of religion. Its factors are simply psycho-physical organisms reacting socially to the conditions of existence. Religion is a product of these factors, and only a product. No special instinct, germ, or other primordial factor is needed. Moreover, this theory makes religion practically a by-product, for it is not directly related to the struggle for existence, or even to any immediate social utility. It is "appreciative" rather than "practical," a luxury rather than a staple food. The gods take no part in our actual adjustments. A deity is nothing but a symbol for values already realized in experience or else looked for in future experience. King is careful to say that he speaks within the limits of psychology

only, leaving out of account the question of the metaphysical existence of a deity. Nevertheless, he explicitly commits himself to a view of reality that makes it merely functional, and therefore brings it wholly within the sphere of functional psychology. "Our concepts are only functionally valid, and do not refer to ontological realities. All our realities are of the functional variety. They are realities because they serve these definite functions, and for no other reason." Possibly the meaning of the first of these apparently contradictory statements is this: "If you hold to a transcendental metaphysics, you can accept this psychological account without necessarily contradicting the notion of a really existing and transcendently efficient deity." But it is clear that King himself writes from the standpoint, not merely of scientific method in general, but also of the philosophy of absolute empiricism. This is not the place to weigh this or any other metaphysics, but it will be appropriate to examine briefly one or two of his broadest generalizations.

The datum out of which religion is to be deduced is psychophysical organisms reacting overtly and in groups to the conditions of existence, and becoming conscious as a consequence. Obviously the adequacy of this datum for the work that is required of it depends upon how we conceive these "psycho-physical organisms." In the first place, being organisms, they must have structure; being psychical, they must have psychical structure. Granted that there are no innate principles such as Locke combated; granted that there is no religious instinct, just as there is no scientific, artistic, or political instinct; nevertheless, political, artistic, and scientific reactions, when they appear, necessitate the assumption of antecedents different from those that would otherwise be required. We learn what the structure is by what the organism does. In various details King uses this principle, though he ignores its applicability to religion as a whole. "When the worth of an object is established by its relations to a group's practical and social life," he says, "it thereby gains enough internal momentum to go on increasing in relative independence of practical and social interests." Again, in each religious rite there are both "form" and "content," the former being determined by the structure of the worshipping body. Especially in the

higher religions we find a certain individuality, a predetermined direction of variations. Further, a god never reflects merely the actual character of his devotees, but also a certain outreaching or projection beyond actual achievements. Finally, variation, however obscure its ground, does always have a specific ground for the particular form that it takes. In view of all these detailed recognitions of the principle, how is it that no specific ground for religion is attributed to the "psycho-physical organism"? The part played by this important factor is, in fact, obscure. What is described as a psycho-physical organism seems to acquire psychological qualities first through its own "overt" activities. Again, consciousness is represented as first of all purely individual. "It is not . . . a part of a larger life, either social or divine." Nevertheless sociality is *assumed* as a precondition of religion.

This indefiniteness in the antecedents accounts in part for a certain shadowiness with respect to the dynamic relations of religion. The wide-spread and persistent activities of religion can hardly be a mere "aside." They can hardly be mere "products" of social forces. If the practically universal religious activity could be shown to have no effect upon mere biological survival, it would of itself demonstrate how far a merely biological conception of the psycho-physical organism comes from explaining religion. That religion is only a product of society and not a producer thereof; that it is only a reflective valuation of life, and not life itself, not adjustment to actual conditions that come to light even in the religious reaction itself; how could one possibly hold to all this except through some over-fondness for data and presuppositions that are inadequately conceived? At several points principles assumed in the work itself seem to require, or at least favor, a more dynamic view of religion. Thus, if we start with overt action as the primal datum of the development, why should not the development itself consist in the gradual attainment of fully controlled, rational, efficient action? And in fact, has religion really gone off on a side-track of uncreative appreciation? In its highest forms is it not, rather, an assertion of a purpose adequate to all the conditions of life, and is not its call precisely to the hardest kind of action? Again, if religion has its source in social action, we should expect it to have some

function in promoting social development. In the case of ancestor-worship such a function is perfectly distinct; and again in the religion of Israel and its continuation in Christianity we have a further development of just such social forces. Here the divinity, like the ancestor-god, appears as a member of a social circle and essential to its completeness. Indeed, a fully socialized religion can no more merely "use" its gods than a fully socialized child can merely use its parents.

It is, therefore, only a partially socialized religion in which the divinity is nothing but a symbol for values experienced, or to be experienced, by the worshipper. Every item of evidence, moreover, that deities are nothing but such symbols can be paralleled by evidence that my fellow-men are likewise simply symbols for my values. In short, it is no mere natural history that we are dealing with here, but a metaphysical or epistemological view which governs the whole argument. "A scientific statement has no meaning," asserts the author, "except within a closed system of definite relations." It would be interesting to know where such a system can be found in any observational science. Professor King applies an altogether too severe standard to his own work. The book is replete with important facts and convincing details of interpretation, but it presents no "closed system."

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